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Abstract
In this paper we embed a directed search model of the real estate market into a heteroge-
neous agents setting to study the effect of credit on housing prices. Households can either rent
or own their home and face idiosyncratic turnover shocks which make them want to change res-
idence. They can accumulate financial assets to put a down payment on a home and to smooth
consumption. Search and matching frictions generate frictional dispersion in housing prices and
financial assets in equilibrium. Our model is “block recursive” and highly tractable. We cal-
ibrate it to reproduce selected statistics for the US. We extend the Endogenous Grid Method
with non-convexities to our environment to compute it. In our framework the distribution of
wealth, housing prices, and trading probabilities (e.g. liquidity of housing assets) are crucially
affected by credit conditions. Our mechanism greatly amplifies the effect of changes in financial
conditions on housing prices.
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1 Introduction
In the expansion period prior to the Great Recession housing prices experienced significant increases
at the same time that financial conditions eased greatly. There is a general consensus that the
increase in the availability of credit fueled the housing boom; see, for instance, Glaeser et al. (2012),
Landvoigt et al. (2015), and Favara and Imbs (2015). Yet the heterogeneous agents literature has
struggled to explain the large impact of the increase in credit on housing prices. The reason is
that, typically, constrained agents are poor and constitute a small fraction of the population, so
they cannot really affect prices; see, for instance, Kiyotaki et al. (2011) and Sommer et al. (2013).
More recent work by Favilukis et al. (2017) shows that a heterogeneous agents framework which
combines aggregate risk and rich idiosyncratic heterogeneity can deliver a significant quantitative
impact of credit conditions on prices.
Search and matching models, however, constitute a powerful mechanism for demand shocks to
affect aggregates; see, for instance, Díaz and Jerez (2013). Also, a recent but growing number
of quantitative studies uses these models to account for several dynamic and cyclical features of
housing markets.1 Yet most of this literature assumes that households are risk neutral and ignores
the households’ savings decisions.2 But, for credit constraints to matter, we need to assume that
households are risk averse and can accumulate financial assets. This paper thus embeds a search-
theoretic model of the housing market into a heterogeneous agents setting to study the effect of
credit on housing prices. We focus our analysis on stationary equilibria.
We consider an environment where households face idiosyncratic turnover shocks which make
them want to change residence. Households consume a nondurable good and housing services, and
can either own or rent their home. Home buyers must search the real estate market in order to buy
a home, the search process being directed as in Moen (1997) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999).
Households can also accumulate a risk-free asset which can be used both to smooth consumption of
the non-housing good and to put a down payment on a home. To keep things simple, we assume a
fixed stock of owner-occupied housing which consists of symmetric (indivisible) units. In particular,
all price dispersion arising in equilibrium is then purely frictional.
1See Díaz and Jerez (2013), Ngai and Tenreyro (2014), Head et al. (2014), and Hedlund (2016b), among others.
2Eerola and Maattanen (2018) and Hedlund (2016a 2016b) (as well as more recent work by this author with
others) are notable exceptions.
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We show that, in equilibrium, home buyers with higher financial wealth –who have a lower
marginal utility of wealth– direct their search to submarkets with higher prices and shorter average
buying times (relative to poorer buyers). In turn, homes with higher prices take longer to sell.3
While frictional price dispersion is hard to measure —houses being hedonic goods, which are het-
erogeneous along many dimensions (some of which are unobservable)— several hedonic analysis in
the real estate literature find variations in house prices after controlling for house characteristics
and location using data for different countries (e. g. see Malpezzi et al., 1980; Elder et al., 1999;
Leung et al., 2006; Yiu et al., 2008; Qiu and Tu, 2018).4 In our setting, any shock affecting demand
affects the distribution of prices paid by home buyers, and thus the mean and variance of housing
prices. It also affects the trading delays faced by different buyers and the degree of housing market
liquidity (e.g. as measured by average time on the market).
We calibrate our model to reproduce selected statistics of the Survey of Consumer Finances for
working age households, such as the homeownership rate, the median wealth to earnings ratio for
renters, the median housing wealth to earnings ratio for owners and their median Loan-To-Value
ratio. Additionally, we calibrate the meeting technology to match the observed median time to buy
reported by the National Association of Realtors.
Our quantitative exercises show that wealth accumulation, price dispersion and market liquidity
are tightly linked, and that the interaction between these variables is crucially affected by credit
conditions. Take the case of a highly liquid market, where demand is high and average buying
(selling) times are long (short). In this scenario buyers who do not find a trading opportunity (a
likely event for poor households) accumulate more assets and, in the next period, they direct their
search towards a submarket with a higher price, where they are more likely to trade. Hence, when
credit is eased, these buyers can afford to enter submarkets with higher prices. Not only that, but
buyer participation also increases, as those other households who were not searching for a home
(e.g. because they were waiting to build a down payment) access the market. This further increases
buyer demand and the overall congestion all buyers face, thus reinforcing the aforementioned asset
accumulation process by households. This mechanism, which operates through the inherent hetero-
3These results are consistent with empirical work in the real estate literature which finds that, after controlling for
housing attributes and location, buyers with higher income tend to pay higher prices (see Elder et al., 1999; Qiu and
Tu, 2018), and search for a shorter period of time on average (see Elder, Zumpano, and Baryla 1999, 2000). There is
also widespread evidence of a positive relation between the price of real estate property and its average time on the
market (e. g. see Trippi, 1977; Miller, 1978; Merlo and Ortalo-Magné, 2004; de Wit and van der Klaauw, 2013).
4Since the seminal work of Burdett and Judd (1983) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998) search theory has been
used to rationalize the existence of frictional price dispersion in several markets (most notably, in labor markets).
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geneity of the economy generated by search and matching frictions, leads to substantial increases
in the average housing price.
Our amplification mechanism critically relies on the inelasticity of the housing supply. For
instance, in our benchmark economy, a 10 percent decrease in the down payment produces a 9.96
percent rise in the average housing price, leaving the homeownership rate almost unaltered. By
contrast, in the opposite extreme case where the housing supply is infinitely elastic, the average
price does not change but the homeownership rate rises from 69.42 to 76.21 percent. We also find
that house price dispersion and average time on the market fall when credit is eased. The effect on
the wealth distribution is complex due to the interaction of changes in liquidity and house prices.
A rise in labor income produces similar effects. In general, our exercises suggest that increases
(reductions) in housing demand reduce (increase) price dispersion and increase (reduce) average
housing prices and the degree of market liquidity.
The work by Eerola and Maattanen (2018) is closely related to ours. These authors embed a
random search model of the housing market into an heterogeneous agents framework with a fixed
supply of identical houses. The model is calibrated using data of the Helsinki metropolitan area.
The quantitative model is then used to study the steady-state effects of changing credit conditions
and the asset holdings of home buyers and sellers on the degree of liquidity and frictional house
price dispersion. The authors’ key finding is that tighter credit conditions reduce overall liquidity
and generate higher price dispersion, as in our model. Nevertheless, due to the lack of tractability of
their model, they cannot study how market liquidity and credit conditions affect the homeownership
rate and the wealth distribution. It is worth emphasizing that both their paper and ours imply
that frictional price dispersion is higher in less liquid markets characteristics of a recession, which
is intuitive, since competition among buyers is weaker in such markets.
Our framework is highly tractable because, as in the directed search models of Shi (2009) and
Menzio and Shi (2010), the agents’ value and policy functions do not depend the distribution of
households across individual states. Instead, they depend on a finite dimensional variable which
summarizes all the relevant information regarding the terms trade in the housing market. This is in
contrast to random search models; e.g. see Molico (2006). In Shi (2009) and Menzio and Shi (2010)
“block recursivity” arises from the combination of directed search and free entry of risk-neutral
firms with constant returns in vacancy creation. In our framework, where the housing supply is
fixed, it arises because we assume that home buyers and sellers do not trade directly with each
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other. Instead, trades are intermediated by agents with linear transferable utility who freely enter
the market.5
An important contribution of this paper is theoretical. The simple recursive structure of our
model allows us to prove existence of the households’ value functions and to derive some of their
properties. In particular, the value functions are shown to be differentiable along the optimal
policies. This suffices to obtain the Euler equations. These results are not trivial since, due to
the lack of concavity of the household’s problem, the theorems of Mirman-Zilcha and Benveniste-
Scheinkman do not apply to our setting. In recent work, Menzio et al. (2013) circumvent the
technical difficulties arising from the non concavity by introducing lotteries. This makes the model
tractable, but obviously not equivalent to the original problem, since the optimal policy functions
differ. In this paper we do not need to introduce lotteries but work directly within the non concave
framework. We also establish a link between the concavity of the value functions and the mono-
tonicity of the optimal consumption policies.6 Our computation strategy is based on these results,
and so is the equilibrium characterization. To the best of our knowledge, our theoretical results
are novel to the literature, and provide a new benchmark for solving similar block-recursive models
with a non-degenerate asset distribution without the need of introducing lotteries.
Our other contribution is computational. To compute the model we modify the Endogenous
Grid Method in Fella (2014) to include not only a non-convex choice (i.e., participate in the market
or not) but also a continuous choice among submarkets that differ both in price and average time
to buy. This method is much more efficient and accurate than standard Value Function Iteration,
which is the methodology typically used in the recent literature that introduces search frictions into
heterogeneous agents models. We comment on some related contributions in this literature below.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our partial equilibrium
environment and the problems solved by agents, and define a stationary equilibrium. Section 3
describes the block-recursive structure of our framework and presents the main theoretical results.
Section 4 describes our calibration procedure and presents our main quantitative results. Section
5 concludes. Proofs and computational details are relegated to the Appendix.
5This is to avoid dealing with a setting with two-sided heterogeneity and two-sided risk aversion, which would
be highly involved. Hedlund (2016a) develops a related model with construction where a different intermediation
technology gives rise to block-recursivity. Yet his focus is different, and his approach is fully computational.
6To derive these results we adapt the approach recently introduced in Rincón-Zapatero (2019). This approach
does not directly apply to the Bellman equations of our model (due to their particular structure) so additional work
is required.
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2 The model economy
In this section we present our model economy and define a stationary equilibrium.
2.1 Preferences and endowments
Consider a location populated by a continuum of households who live forever. Time is discrete.
Households derive utility from the consumption of a divisible good and the service flow provided by
an indivisible durable good which we refer to as housing. Their lifetime utility is∑∞t=0E0βtu(ct, ht),
where ct, ht ∈ R+ are the amounts of the divisible good and housing services consumed each
period, respectively, and β is the discount factor. The per-period felicity function u is strictly
increasing, strictly concave and C2, with uch ≥ 0 and limh→0 u(c, h) = −∞. Households have a
fixed endowment w of the divisible good every period, and can choose to either own or rent a
housing unit. For simplicity, we assume that they value the services of a single unit and can own
at most one unit each period. There is a fixed stock of owner-occupied housing which consists of
H symmetric units which do not depreciate. We think of the housing market in our model as a
secondary market.
Each period homeowners face idiosyncratic preference shocks which affect their consumption of
housing services. Specifically, they can be in two idiosyncratic states, µ ∈ {0, 1}. Owners in state
1 consume ~ > 0 units of housing services, whereas owners in state 0 consume none. In words,
owners in state 1 are matched with their home, and owners in state 0 are mismatched. The state
µ follows a Markov process with transition probabilities P (µ′ = 1|µ = 1) = 1 − piµ ∈ (0, 1) and
P (µ′ = 0|µ = 0) = 1. So µ = 0 is an absorbing state; owners can only transit out of this state by
selling their home and moving to a new unit. By contrast, renters consume an exogenous amount
hr of housing services, where 0 < hr ≤ ~. We thus allow for a taste for ownership.
Households face also idiosyncratic moving shocks (which are realized jointly with the owners’
preference shocks). Owners and renters are hit by these shocks with different time-invariant prob-
abilities, denoted by piξ0 , piξr ∈ (0, 1), respectively.7 All idiosyncratic shocks are independent across
households. Households hit by a moving shock migrate to a symmetric location in the rest of the
7This is for calibration purposes since, in the data, renters move more often than owners; e.g. see Head et al.
(2014).
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world at no cost, and are instantaneously replaced by an equal mass of immigrants. The details
on these entry flows are specified below. We normalize the constant measure of households in the
location to one.
Our benchmark model abstracts away from idiosyncratic labor income risk and aggregate risk.
We simply introduce the minimum amount of idiosyncratic risk needed to generate turnover in the
housing market.
2.2 Market arrangements and real estate intermediation
Financial market arrangements are as in Díaz and Luengo-Prado (2010). Households can save by
means of a risk-free asset with price 1/R ∈ R+ (in units of the non-housing good). Their home
purchases can be partially financed with a non-defaultable mortgage loan. Specifically, a household
can borrow up to a fraction (1 − δ) of the home’s market value, so it must save in order to meet
the corresponding down payment. The mortgage is a loan in perpetuity with no costs associated if
there is early repayment. Houses also serve as collateral for loans: homeowners can obtain a home
equity loan for up to a fraction (1−δ) of the home’s value (i.e., they can always remortgage). There
are indirect taxes on real estate transactions. Home sellers pay taxes on the value of the house
at the rate τs, whereas the buyers’ tax rate is τb. For simplicity, we assume that tax revenues are
thrown away. Also, there is no spread between borrowing and lending rates, and households who
do not own residential assets cannot borrow.
Real estate transactions are intermediated by agents with linear transferable utility who are
free to enter the market each period. These agents purchase homes from mismatched owners, and
then look for potential buyers.8 Intermediaries are also infinitely-lived with discount factor β and
can hold at most one unit each period. We do not model the rental market explicitly, and assume
that any household who wants to rent a home can do so at a fixed price rh.
We now specify the timing of the model, and describe the market structure in detail. Each
period is divided into three subperiods: morning, afternoon, and night.
8This is not what most real estate agents do in reality. Yet it is a useful modeling choice which generates a simple
block-recursive structure. We assume that intermediaries have deep pockets (and do not require credit to finance
their purchases) and do not pay taxes.
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2.2.1 Morning
At the start of a period, there are two types of households in the economy depending on their tenure
status: owners and renters. First, preference and moving shocks are realized. A Walrasian market
then opens where the owners who have been hit by these shocks supply their homes inelastically.9
Intermediaries can freely enter this market to purchase a unit at the market clearing price, p. Once
the market closes, the households hit by the moving shock migrate and are replaced by an equal
measure of immigrants who do not own residential assets.
Note that home sellers do not face trading delays in our model; it is intermediaries who face
the inventory risk, as we shall see. Yet this risk will be priced into p. We introduce the Walrasian
market because it highly simplifies the analysis, allowing us to focus on buyers’ outcomes.10
2.2.2 Afternoon
During the afternoon, those households who sold their home in the morning and did not migrate,
those who were renters in the previous period, and the newly arrived immigrants decide whether
to rent a home in the current period or search for a home to buy. We refer to these households
as potential buyers. Matched owners make no economic decisions in this subperiod, so we refer to
them as non-traders.
A competitive search market operates in the afternoon where intermediaries put their vacant
homes up for sale at cost κs > 0, and buyers search for a unit which suits their needs at a negligible
cost.11 Home buyers may borrow up to a fraction (1 − δ) of the home’s value in the Walrasian
morning market; i.e., their borrowing limit is (1 − δ) p. The implicit assumption (as in Kiyotaki
and Moore, 1997) is that banks lend the amount they can recover in the Walrasian market if they
seized the house. Potential buyers may choose not to participate in the afternoon market (e.g. if
9This is optimal for mismatched owners as limh→0 u(c, h) = −∞. It is also optimal for owners who are hit by the
moving (but not the preference shock) if they face a sufficiently high cost of leaving their home unsold.
10See Hedlund (2016a) for a more complex setting where both buyers and sellers face trading delays, and where
a different intermediation technology á la Lagos and Rocheteau (2005) gives rise to “block-recursivity”. Hedlund
studies the interaction between the credit market and the cyclical behavior of housing market aggregates. His main
finding is that the increasing illiquidity characteristic of a slowdown in housing markets tightens credit constraints
for borrowers (who find it harder to sell their home), creating a vicious circle that increases foreclosure activity and
further depresses that the housing market.
11This cost is introduced to rule out equilibria where some households participate in the frictional market even
though they do not plan to trade there (because doing so is costless).
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they have not accumulated enough assets to meet the corresponding down payment).
The competitive search process is as in Moen (1997). Buyers and intermediaries can participate
in different submarkets where they meet bilaterally and at random, and where each trader expe-
riences at most one bilateral match. The probabilities with which buyers and intermediaries meet
each other in a given submarket depend on the associated buyer-seller ratio θ (or market tightness).
Specifically, an intermediary meets a potential buyer with probability ms(θ), and a buyer meets
an intermediary with probability mb(θ) = ms(θ)/θ.12 As is standard, ms(θ) is strictly increasing,
strictly concave and C2, with ms(0) = 0 and limθ→∞ms(θ) = 1. Also, mb(θ) is strictly decreasing
and C2, with limθ→0mb(θ) = 1 and limθ→∞mb(θ) = 0. Intuitively, the higher the buyer-seller ratio
θ, the easier it is for intermediaries to contact buyers and the harder it is for buyers to locate a
vacant home for sale (due to congestion externalities). As θ goes to infinity (zero) the probability
that an intermediary meets a buyer goes to one (zero), and the probability that a buyer meets an
intermediary goes to zero (one). The elasticity η(θ) ≡ m′s(θ)θms(θ) ∈ [0, 1] is assumed non increasing,
and mˆs(mb) ≡ ms(m−1b (·)) is such that ln mˆs is concave.13
To model market participation, it is useful to introduce a fictitious submarket θ0 ∈ R−, and
extend the functions mb and ms to Θ ≡ R+ ∪ {θ0} by setting mb(θ0) = ms(θ0) = 0. Households
who choose θ0 (rather than θ ∈ R+) do not participate in the afternoon market.
To describe the price determination process in the competitive search market, we adopt the
price-taking approach in Jerez (2014). The idea is to think of houses traded in submarkets with
different tightness levels θ ∈ R+ as different commodities, which are characterized by different
degrees of trading uncertainty. The prices of these differentiated commodities are described by a
continuous function p : Θ→ R+, with p(θ0) = 0. That is, p(θ) is the housing price in a submarket
with tightness θ ∈ R+. Buyers and intermediaries have rational expectations about the tightness
level prevailing in active submarkets, and choose the submarkets they enter taking p(θ) as given.
As shown in Jerez (2014), our price-taking equilibrium notion is equivalent to that of directed
search. In particular, p(θ) is the inverse of the schedule θ(p) describing the agents’ beliefs (about
the tightness level in submarkets with different prices) in Moen (1997) and Acemoglu and Shimer
(1999). We choose the price-taking formulation because it makes the connection with the standard
12Implicit is the assumption that the total number of bilateral trading meetings is determined by a matching
function with constant returns to scale, and that the Law of Large Numbers holds.
13That is, −mˆs′(mb)/mˆs(mb) is non decreasing. This assumption guarantees that the problem solved by potential
buyers is concave and has a unique solution (see Sections A-C in the Appendix), and can be further relaxed (see
Section D.1). See also Menzio and Shi (2010) where mˆs is assumed concave (a slightly stronger assumption).
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notion of recursive competitive equilibrium more direct and transparent. The crucial difference
with the standard competitive equilibrium notion is that the frictional afternoon market does not
clear in equilibrium.
2.2.3 Night
Households who bought a home in the afternoon are owners at night, just as the non-traders. The
rest of the households are renters. At night households receive the endowment w, and decide their
consumption of the divisible good and the amount of assets to be carried to next period.
2.3 Stationary equilibrium
Below we state the problems of the agents in each subperiod (starting at night and going backwards),
the law of motion of the distribution of households across individual states, and that of the vacancy
stock held by intermediaries. A stationary equilibrium is then defined.
2.3.1 Night
Since intermediaries are inactive at night, we only need to describe the problem solved by house-
holds. Let A = [a,∞) be the set in which financial assets can take values, and a ∈ A be the amount
of financial assets held by a household at the start of the night. The afternoon value functions of
potential buyers and non-traders are Wb : A→ R and Wn : A→ R, respectively. The night value
function of an owner is then given by
Wo(a) = max
c,a′∈R
{
u (c, ~) + β (1− piξo) (1− piµ) Wn (a′)
+β [1− (1− piξo) (1− piµ)] Wb (a′ + (1− τs) p)
}
s.t. c+ 1R a′ ≤ w + a,
a′ ≥ −(1− δ) p,
c ≥ 0,
(2.1)
where c and ~ are the amounts of the divisible good and housing services consumed, and a′ is
the amount of financial assets carried to the next period. Owners choose the values of c and a′
9
to maximize their expected lifetime utility subject to a standard intertemporal budget constraint,
and also face a borrowing limit equal to (1− δ) p. (As described earlier, they can remortgage their
home, in which case the price of reappraisal is the Walrasian market price.) With probability piξo ,
owners will be hit by a moving shock in the next morning. If not, there is still a probability piµ that
they will become mismatched. An owner who is not hit by any of these shocks will be a non-trader
in the next afternoon, with continuation value Wn(a′). An owner who is hit will sell her home at
price p in the next morning and pay the corresponding indirect taxes. Note that the assumption
that agents hit by the moving shock migrate to a symmetric location at no cost implies that the
owner’s continuation value is the same regardless of the kind of shock that hits her. Owners hit
by the preference (but not by the moving) shock will be potential buyers in their current location,
whereas owners hit by the moving shock will be potential buyers elsewhere. In both cases, their
continuation value is Wb(a′ + (1 − τs) p). Denote the owners’ optimal decision rules by gco(a) and
gao (a).
The night value function of a renter is defined in a similar way:
Wr(a) = max
c,a′∈R
{
u (c, hr) + βWb (a′)
}
s.t. c+ 1R a′ ≤ w − rh + a,
a′ ≥ 0,
c ≥ 0,
(2.2)
and gcr(a) and gar (a) denote the optimal decision rules. The main difference is that these households
pay the rent, rh, and consume hr units of housing services, and are not allowed to borrow. Also,
their continuation value is not affected by the moving shocks they face. Whether or not they
migrate, they will be potential buyers in the next afternoon (either in the current location or in a
symmetric location elsewhere).
2.3.2 Afternoon
Let a be the household’s financial assets at noon. Non-traders are inactive during the afternoon,
so their value function is given by
Wn(a) = Wo(a), (2.3)
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Consider now the problem faced by potential buyers. These agents choose the submarkets they join
taking as given the price schedule, p(θ), and the maximum loan they can obtain, (1 − δ) p. Their
value function is given by
Wb(a) = max
θ∈Θ
{
mb (θ) Wo (a− (1 + τb) p(θ)) + (1−mb (θ)) Wr (a)
}
s. t. a− (1 + τb) p(θ) ≥ −(1− δ) p if θ ∈ R+,
(2.4)
and gθb (a) denotes their optimal decision rule. The collateralized borrowing constraint in (2.4)
ensures that households who join submarket θ ∈ R+ have enough assets to pay for the down
payment and the taxes associated to the transaction. With probability mb(θ) these households
buy a home and enter the night with financial assets a − (1 + τb) p(θ).14 With complementary
probability, they do not trade and carry their full assets into the night, when they will be renters
(which is also what happens to potential buyers who choose not to participate in the afternoon
market).
Likewise, intermediaries choose the submarkets they join in order to maximize their expected
lifetime value given p(θ), so their expected value in the afternoon is
J = max
θ∈R+
{
− κs +ms (θ) p(θ) + (1−ms (θ)) β J
}
. (2.5)
Intermediaries who join submarket θ ∈ R+ pay the cost κs and sell their unit with probability
ms(θ) at price p(θ), in which case they exit the location. With complementary probability, they do
not trade and must wait until the next afternoon, when they will continue to search for a buyer.
We denote the set of optimal solutions for problem (2.5) by ΘJ .15
2.3.3 Morning
Recall that owners hit by a shock sell their home at price p in the morning (whereas the rest of the
households are inactive in this subperiod). By free entry, the expected profits of the intermediaries
14Households with a mortgage have negative assets at night and pay interests on that debt, as implied by the
intertemporal budget constraint in problem (2.1).
15As is standard in these models, in equilibrium ΘJ includes a continuum of elements, intermediaries being indif-
ferent between all θ ∈ ΘJ (see Section 3).
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who enter the Walrasian market are zero in equilibrium:
p = J. (2.6)
2.3.4 Stationary equilibrium definition
In order to define a stationary equilibrium, we also need to describe the evolution of the distribution
of agents across individual states and over time. Let us first focus on households. The distribution
of non-traders and potential buyers at noon is described by the Borel measures ψn, ψb ∈ M+(A),
respectively. Similarly, ψo, ψr ∈ M+(A) represent the distribution of owners and renters at night.
We use primes to denote the corresponding measures in the next period. Since the total mass of
households is one,
ψn(A) + ψb(A) = 1, (2.7)
ψr(A) + ψo(A) = 1. (2.8)
We describe the asset distribution of immigrants by an exogenous probability measure ζi ∈ P (A) ⊂
M+(A). Since net migration flows are zero, the inflow of immigrants is given by ψi ∈M+(A) with
ψi
ψi(A)
= ζi, (2.9)
ψi(A) = piξrψr(A) + piξoψo(A). (2.10)
Let A denote the Borel σ-algebra on A. Define the transition function Qo : A × A → [0, 1]
which gives the probability that an owner holding a˜ ∈ A assets at night will carry an amount of
assets in X ∈ A into the next morning. Likewise, Qr denotes the corresponding transition function
for renters.16 The laws of motions from the night to the following afternoon are
ψ′n (X) = (1− piµ) (1− piξo)
∫
a∈A
Qo(a,X)dψo, (2.11)
ψ′b (X) = (1− piξr)
∫
a∈A
Qr(a,X)dψr + piµ (1− piξo)
∫
a∈A
Qo(a,X)dψo + ψi (X) , (2.12)
16That is, Qj(a,X) = ψj({a ∈ A : gaj (a) ∈ X}) for j ∈ {o, r}.
12
for each X ∈ A. Similarly, the laws of motion from the afternoon to the night are
ψ′o (X) = ψn (X) +
∫
a∈A
Πo (a,X) dψb, (2.13)
ψ′r (X) =
∫
a∈A
Πr (a,X) dψb, (2.14)
where the transition functions Πo : A×A → [0, 1] and Πr : A×A → [0, 1] give the probability that
a potential buyer holding a assets at the start of the afternoon will be an owner or a renter with
assets in X at night, respectively.17
A measure b ∈ M+(R+) describing the distribution of buyers across submarkets is easily con-
structed from ψb and gθb :
b(Ξ) = ψb
(
{a ∈ A : gθb (a) ∈ Ξ}
)
, for all Borel Ξ ⊂ R+. (2.15)
That is, b(Ξ) is the measure of buyers who participate in a submarket θ ∈ Ξ. Similarly, we describe
the distribution of intermediaries across submarkets by s ∈ M+(R+). The support of s contains
elements θ ∈ ΘJ which solve problem (2.5). The precise distribution s on ΘJ will be determined
by rational expectations (see equation (2.20) below). The set of active submarkets (which attract
both buyers and intermediaries) is given by the intersection of the supports of b and s.
It remains to describe the law of motion of the vacancy stock held by intermediaries. Let V˜
be the stock at the start of a period, which is equal to the mass of intermediaries who did not sell
their vacant units in the previous period. The mass of new intermediaries who enter the Walrasian
morning market, ∆V , is equal to the number of units supplied in this market (by the owners who
are hit by either a moving or a preference shock), since this market clears in equilibrium. That is,
∆V = [piξo + piµ (1− piξo)] ψo(A). (2.16)
17These probabilities are related to the probability that the buyer purchases a home in the afternoon, which depends
on the submarket θ she joins. A successful trade implies, not only a change in tenure status, but also a change in the
financial assets (which again depends on θ). Specifically,
Πo(a,X) =
{
mb
(
gθb (a)
)
, if a− (1 + τb) p
(
gθb (a)
)
∈ X,
0, otherwise,
Πr(a,X) =
{
1−mb
(
gθb (a)
)
, if a ∈ X,
0, otherwise.
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Hence, the vacancy stock held by intermediaries at noon is
V = V˜ + ∆V. (2.17)
These are the units which are up for sale in the different afternoon submarkets:
V =
∫
θ∈R+
ds = s(ΘJ). (2.18)
Finally, those intermediaries who do not trade in the afternoon carry their inventories into the next
period:
V˜ ′ =
∫
θ∈R+
[1−ms(θ)] ds. (2.19)
We are now ready to define a stationary equilibrium.
Definition 1. A recursive stationary equilibrium for this economy, given the interest rate R−1, the
rental housing price rh and the probability distribution of the immigrants’ asset holdings ζi, is a list
of value functions and optimal decision rules for the households
{
Wo,Wr,Wn,Wb, g
c
o, g
a
o , g
c
r, g
a
r , g
θ
b
}
,
a value J and a set ΘJ of optimal decisions for intermediaries in the afternoon, prices (p, p(·)),
Borel measures
{
ψo, ψr, ψn, ψb, ψi, b, s
}
, and positive real numbers (V,∆V ) such that:
1. Households’ optimality:
{
Wo,Wr,Wn,Wb, g
c
o, g
a
o , g
c
r, g
a
r , g
θ
b
}
solve the households’ problems in
(2.1)–(2.4) given (p, p(·)).
2. Intermediaries’ optimality and zero profits: J and ΘJ solve the intermediary’s problem in
(2.5) given p(·), and the zero profit condition in (2.6) holds.
3. All agents have rational beliefs about the tightness levels prevailing in active submarkets during
the afternoon:
∫
θ∈Ξ
db =
∫
θ∈Ξ
θ ds, for all Borel Ξ ⊂ R+, (2.20)
where b is given by (2.15), and supp s ⊂ ΘJ .
4. The Walrasian morning market clears: ∆V is given by (2.16).
5. The vacancy stock at the start each period is stationary: ∆V =
∫
θ∈R+ ms(θ) ds.
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6. The total number of homes that are either owner-occupied or for sale in the afternoon is equal
to the housing stock: V + ψn(A) = H.
7. The stationary probability measures
{
ψo, ψr, ψn, ψb, ψi
}
satisfy equations (2.7)–(2.10) and the
laws of motion in (2.11)–(2.14).
The only equilibrium condition that is not self-explanatory is the rational expectations condition
in equation (2.20). This condition ensures that the measures of buyers and intermediaries in each
active submarket are consistent with the tightness levels that agents take as given when they make
their optimal afternoon decisions. Intuitively, ds represents the density of intermediaries and db
represents the density of buyers in the set of active submarkets. If the traders’ conjectures about
the buyer-seller ratio θ are correct then (roughly speaking) db should be equal to θ ds.18
3 Block-recursivity and equilibrium characterization
In this section we show that the equilibrium is block-recursive and exploit this feature to derive some
properties of the value and policy functions, and to characterize the equilibrium sorting pattern in
the frictional market.
3.1 Equilibrium price schedule
In equilibrium, the price schedule p(·)—an infinite dimensional object which is used to calculate
the households’ value and policy functions—is pinned down by the value of p. This allows us to
get around the curse of dimensionality to compute the equilibrium.
This result is easily derived. Combining (2.5) and (2.6) yields:
p(θ) ≤ κs + (1− β) p
ms (θ)
+ β p, for all θ ∈ R+, with strict equality if θ ∈ ΘJ . (3.1)
In active submarkets, (3.1) then holds with equality. In particular, prices are lower in submarkets
where θ is higher (since ms is strictly increasing). Intuitively, since intermediaries get the same
18Formally, (2.20) says that b is absolutely continuous with respect to s, with Radon-Nikodym derivative θ. The
supports of b and s then coincide almost everywhere, and this common support gives the set of submarkets which are
active in equilibrium. Condition (2.20) replaces the standard market clearing condition in frictionless models. See
also Peters (1997), Eeckhout and Kircher (2010), and Jerez (2014).
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expected payoff J in all active submarkets and the probability of completing a sale increases with
θ, prices must be higher in those active submarkets where θ is lower. On the other hand, prices in
inactive markets imply a (weakly) lower expected payoff for intermediaries.
In fact, there is no loss of generality in assuming that (3.1) holds with equality for all θ ∈ R+,
so prices are such that intermediaries get the same payoff in all submarkets, whether active or not.
A standard feature of general equilibrium models with a continuum of commodities is that prices
in inactive markets are indeterminate; e.g. see Gretsky et al. (1999). Selecting a function p(θ)
which satisfies (3.1) with equality for all θ ∈ R+ is equivalent to selecting the highest prices that
support the equilibrium allocation in our model.19 With this price selection rule, p(θ) is pinned
down by p. By the zero profit condition, J = p, so p is the average return from a vacant home for
sale in the frictional market. As shown in Figure 1, the selected price function is strictly convex
and C2 (because ms is strictly concave and C2). It is also bounded below by pmin ≡ κs + p (the
sum of the Walrasian price and cost of posting a vacancy in the frictional market), which is the
price intermediaries would charge if the probability of selling the house was one (in order to break
even). Since trade is subject to rationing, no intermediary would trade at a price p ≤ pmin.
The equilibrium of this economy is block recursive because the problems solved by potential
buyers and intermediaries do not depend directly on the (infinite-dimensional) distribution of house-
holds over assets. They only depend on the Walrasian price (a scalar). Given p, the agents know
the equilibrium price schedule in the frictional market. This is all they need to know to make their
optimal decisions. The households’ asset distribution only affects the agents decisions through its
effect on p. This block-recursive structure arises because (1) search in the afternoon market is
directed, and (2) intermediaries have linear transferable utility (i.e, they are risk-neutral and have
deep pockets) and make zero profits in equilibrium.20
19As discussed in Jerez (2014), this price selection rule is equivalent to the restriction typically imposed on out-of-
equilibrium beliefs in directed search models, known as the market utility property. See, for instance, Peters (1997),
Shi (2009), Eeckhout and Kircher (2010), and Menzio and Shi (2010).
20Even without free entry, our arguments go through provided the mass of intermediaries who seek to buy homes
in the Walrasian market is higher than the mass of home sellers in that market (so intermediaries make zero expected
profits). Yet the argument would break down if there where excess supply in this market. In this case, home sellers
would be rationed and intermediaries would make a positive expected profit, J−p, which would depend on the sellers’
asset distribution.
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3.2 Properties of the value functions
In Appendix A we show that, given the selected price function, the dynamic programming problems
(2.1)–(2.4) admit continuous solutions Wo, Wr, Wn and Wb which are unique in a suitable class
of functions (under quite general conditions).21 Also, Wo, Wr and Wn are strictly increasing and
Wb is non-decreasing. Whereas these functions need not be concave and differentiable in general,
in Appendix B we show that they are differentiable along the optimal paths. This is all we need
to establish the validity of the Euler equations used in our computation. We also show that, if we
restrict to the range of assets of the households who participate in the frictional market, Wo, Wr
and Wo are strictly concave and Wb is concave provided the renters’ consumption policy function,
gcr(a), is non-decreasing on this range. This is the case in our numerical analysis. In particular, due
to the endogenous participation decision, Wb is not concave on A, but it is concave on the range
of assets that correspond to participation (those a ∈ A with Wb(a) > Wr(a)). We exploit this
concavity to derive the sorting result and to characterize the participation threshold in the next
section, and to compute the optimal policy function of a potential buyer, gθb (a) (see Appendix D).
3.3 Sorting and participation in the frictional market
It is direct to show that buyers with different financial assets sort themselves out across submarkets
with different prices and different trading probabilities. The optimal decision rule of the buyers
who choose to participate is
gθb (a) ∈ arg max
θ∈R+
{
Wr (a) +mb (θ) [Wo (a− (1 + τb) p(θ))−Wr (a)]
}
s. t. a− (1 + τb) p(θ) ≥ −(1− δ) p.
(3.2)
The buyer’s ex-post gains from trading at price p are given by
S(a, p) = Wo (a− (1 + τb) p)−Wr (a) , (3.3)
21The method of proof is classical, and is based on a contraction mapping theorem. See Theorem 1.
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and realized with probability mb (θ). Buyers choose the submarket θ ∈ R+ where their expected
gains are highest. Since Wo is differentiable, gθb (a) satisfies the first-order condition
m′b(θ)S(a, p(θ))−mb(θ)W ′o (a− (1 + τb)p(θ)) (1 + τb) p′(θ) = λ(a) (1 + τb) p′(θ), (3.4)
where λ(a) is the Lagrange multiplier of the borrowing constraint in (3.2). If the constraint is not
binding, (3.4) simplifies to
( 1
1 + τb
)(1− η(θ)
θ
)(
S(a, p(θ))
W ′o (a− (1 + τb) p(θ))
)
= −p′(θ), (3.5)
where η(θ) is the elasticity of ms(θ). The left-hand side of (3.5) represents the buyer’s marginal
rate of substitution of θ for p. Equation (3.5) says that the buyer’s optimal choice is characterized
by a tangency between her indifference curve on the space (θ, p) and the equilibrium price function
p(θ). The optimal choice of an unconstrained buyer then attains the highest indifference curve
along the price function p, as depicted in Figure 1.
Since the schedule p(θ) corresponds to the intermediaries zero isoprofit line on the space (θ, p),
the indifference curve of the buyer is tangent to this isoprofit line. This is the standard characteri-
zation of a directed search equilibrium in the absence of credit constraints (e. g. see Moen, 1997;
Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999). The tangency condition (3.5) can then also be expressed as:
( 1
1 + τb
)(
S(a, p(θ))
W ′o (a− (1 + τ)p(θ))
)
= η(θ)1− η(θ)
(
p(θ)− p
R
)
. (3.6)
The second term in the left-hand side of (3.5) represents the buyer’s ex-post gains from trading in
submarket θ in units of the no-housing good (as W ′o is the marginal utility of wealth of an owner
at night). In turn, (p(θ) − p/R) are the gains that accrue to intermediaries. In the absence of
taxation (τb = 0), (3.6) generalizes the well-known condition in Hosios (1990) for environments
with transferable utility to our environment with one-sided risk aversion. This condition says that
a fraction η(θ) of the bilateral trading surplus is appropriated by the buyer and a fraction 1− η(θ)
goes to the intermediary.
If the borrowing constraint binds,
p
(
gθb (a)
)
= a+ (1− δ) p(1 + τb) . (3.7)
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Constrained buyers join the submarket where the housing price equals the maximum price they
can afford to pay given the assets they have accumulated, the taxes involved in the transaction and
the borrowing limit (see Figure 2).22 These buyers start the night subperiod with a negative asset
position equal to −(1− δ) p. As one would expect, for constrained buyers the shadow price of the
borrowing constraint, λ(a), decreases with a (see Lemma 1 in Appendix C). There are then three
possible cases. Either all buyers are unconstrained, they are all constrained, or the constraint only
binds below a threshold. The last case is the relevant one in our quantitative analysis, as we shall
see.
For a given p, the problem of a constrained buyer has a unique solution, characterized by (3.7).
The same is true for unconstrained buyers provided gcr(a) is non decreasing (and so Wo is concave)
on the range of assets that correspond to participation. In this case, there is a single tangency
point between the buyers’ indifference curves and the price schedule p(θ).23 This means that all
buyers with the same level of financial assets join the same submarket in equilibrium.
Proposition 1. A solution to the problem of a potential buyer exists. Moreover, if gcr(a) is non
decreasing on the range of a for which θ0 /∈ gθb (a) then gθb (a) is single-valued on this range.
We now turn to the equilibrium sorting pattern. For constrained buyers, (3.7) implies that
p(gθb (a)) increases and gθb (a) decreases with a. Under the conditions of Proposition 1, this is also
the case for unconstrained buyers provided the gains from trading at a given price p, S(a, p),
increase with a.24 In this case, the buyers’ indifference curves are steeper when a is higher (see
Figure 3). In words, buyers with higher financial wealth are willing to accept a larger price increase
in order to increase their trading probability (while remaining indifferent) relative to buyers with
lower assets. This implies that in equilibrium wealthier buyers trade in more expensive submarkets
where average buying times are shorter. This endogenous separation of different agent types across
different submarkets is a typical property of directed search models with heterogeneity.
Proposition 2. (Sorting by financial assets). For constrained buyers, gθb (a′) < gθb (a) if a < a′. If
22In this case, the sharing rule is distorted away from the Hosios rule (even if τb = 0).
23Since η(θ) is non-increasing, one cannot conclude from (3.5) that the buyer’s marginal rate of substitution
increases along an indifference curve as θ rises (as depicted in Figure 1). One may circumvent this issue assuming
that traders choose mb rather than θ, since there is a one-to-one mapping between both variables. Under the
assumption in Proposition 1, the indifference curves of buyers and the isoprofit lines of intermediaries in the space
(mb, p) have a strictly convex shape, so they are tangent at most one point.
24Again, this is the case in our computations. It is direct to check that a sufficient condition for this requirement
is that the purchase of a home always implies a lower night consumption level: gco (a− (1 + τb)pmin) < gcr(a).
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gcr(a) is non decreasing the range of a for which θ0 /∈ gθb (a) and S(a, p) increases with a for each
p ≥ pmin then gθb (a) is strictly decreasing on this range (whether or not buyers are constrained).
Regarding the participation decision, under the conditions in Proposition 2, there is a threshold
apart ∈ A such that potential buyers with assets a > apart strictly prefer to participate, those with
assets apart are indifferent between participating or not, and the rest do not participate. Thus
Wb(a) > Wr(a) for all a > apart, and Wb(a) = Wr(a) for a ≤ apart. The optimal price paid by
buyers with assets apart (when they participate) is the lowest housing price in the frictional market.
Proposition 3. (Participation) Suppose that Wb(a) > Wr(a) for some a. Under the conditions
in Proposition 2, there is a threshold apart ∈ A such that gθb (a) ∈ R+ if a > apart, gθb (a) = θ0 if
a < apart, and gθb (apart) = {θ0, θ} where θ is the tightness prevaling in the cheapest active submarket.
4 Quantitative analysis
In this section we assess the quantitative properties of our theory. We start by briefly discussing
the computation of the model economy and our calibration strategy. We then present the main
statistics of the benchmark economy, as well as some comparative static results.
4.1 Computation
Before describing our computation method it is useful to compare our framework to related search
models studying the interaction between wealth accumulation and frictional wage dispersion, such
as Krusell et al. (2017), Chaumont and Shi (2018) or Eeckhout and Sepahsalari (2018). These
models assume, as we do here, that only one side of the market (workers in their setting versus
households in ours) is risk averse, whereas the other (firms seeking to fill job vacancies there versus
intermediaries here) has linear transferable utility and is free to enter the economy. Our sorting
result is the parallel of that of Chaumont and Shi (2018), whereby wealthier workers get higher
wages and take longer to switch employment states.25 There are some important differences though.
First, whereas the housing stock is exogenous here, labor search models typically assume that firms
25See also Eeckhout and Sepahsalari (2018) and Herkenhoff (2018). Menzio et al. (2013) obtain a similar sorting
result in the context of a monetary search model.
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may create new vacancies each period at an exogenous fixed cost. The equivalent of this assumption
in our setting would be to assume that intermediaries can build new homes at an exogenous cost. By
free entry, the Walrasian morning price, p, would be equal to this cost in equilibrium. We will return
to this issue in Section 4.4, where we show that movements in the Walrasian price are crucial for
changes in aggregate (e.g. financial) conditions to affect the distribution of frictional prices in our
quantitative model. A second difference is that, in our setting, households use financial assets not
only to smooth (non-housing) consumption but also to build equity to pay the down payment. This
introduces a not trivial participation margin. Because of the endogenous participation decision,
the household’s problem in our model has an additional non convexity which is not present in the
above labor models. A similar non convexity arises in the monetary search model of Menzio et al.
2013, where households accumulate real money holdings instead of financial assets with a positive
return. Nevertheless, as shown in Section 3.2, in our setting the value functions turn out to have
standard properties on the range of assets that corresponds to participation.26
The computation of the model is not straightforward. One possibility would be to discretize
the choice of financial assets and use value function iteration to solve the household’s problems (in
both stages). This is the procedure used by Chaumont and Shi (2018), Eeckhout and Sepahsalari
(2018) and Hedlund (2016b), for instance. The drawback of this approach is that, by discretizing
the choice of financial assets, we would be limiting the number of submarkets that are active
in equilibrium ex ante, which may bias our results on price dispersion, specially when we conduct
policy exercises. We instead apply the results in Section 3.2 and we compute the policy functions by
solving the Euler equations. Our computation uses the endogenous grid method (EGM hereafter).
Specifically, we extend the procedure in Fella (2014) to our framework. Fella (2014) modifies the
EGM to include a discrete control variable subject to exogenous non-convex adjustment costs, in
addition to the standard continuous variable. His algorithm yields substantial gains in accuracy
and computational time relative to standard techniques used to solve non concave problems. Here
we have a discrete choice (participating or not in the frictional market) and two continuum choices
(the choice of submarket and savings). Also, instead of exogenous adjustment costs, home buyers
face endogenous trading delays, as the choice of submarket determines the probability of buying
(which is 1 in Fella’s case). Furthermore, an inspection of the problem of potential buyers described
26It should also be noted that transactions in labor and housing markets are fundamentally different, in particular,
because households may participate in both sides of the housing market (both buying and selling houses). Also,
interactions between workers and employers are inherently dynamic, while the housing transactions we describe are
one-time transactions.
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in (2.4) shows that the computation may be further complicated by the fact that mb(θ) is convex.
Consistently with our theoretical results, in our computed equilibria the buyer’s problem is always
concave and has a unique solution. In Appendix D we describe in detail the computation method
we use to solve the household’s problem as well as to find the stationary equilibrium.
4.2 Calibration
The model period is a month. We use the additively separable felicity function
u (c, h) = c
1−σ
1− σ + log(h). (4.1)
Recall that matched owners consume ~ housing services, and renters consume hr. As in Chaumont
and Shi (2018), the matching technology is given by
ms(θ) =
(
1 + θ−γ
)−1
γ , mb(θ) = ms(θ)/θ, (4.2)
with γ > 0. We use this function instead of the standard urn-ball matching function because it has
an extra degree of freedom in that γ governs the elasticity of mb(θ) with respect to θ.27 We will
come back to this issue when we discuss our results. We take the set where financial assets take
values to be bounded, A = [a, a]. The lower bound is ensured by the borrowing constraint, whereas
the upper bound is ensured by the fact that there is always a positive probability that households
buy a home and thus run down their assets.
Table 1 shows the calibration of the benchmark economy. We interpret the endowment of the
non-housing good as labor income and set w = 1000. (Recall that there is no labor income risk.)
We calibrate the preference and mobility shocks to match the following observations on household
turnover. According to the National Association of Realtors (NAR), average tenure length for US
homeowners is around ten years. As in Head et al. (2014), we have assumed that households move
across locations and target the annual frequency of owners and renters moving across counties in
the US, which is about 3.2 and 12 percent, respectively, according to the Census Bureau. The
three targets combined are used to calibrate the probabilities of the three shocks, piµ, piξo , and piξr .
27With the urn-ball matching process this elasticity is constant. Since our computation method requires a one-
to-one relationship between θ and mb(θ), we cannot use the standard (truncated) Cobb-Douglas matching function
(which implies mb = 1 for any θ sufficiently low).
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The risk aversion parameter is set equal to σ = 2, which is a standard value. Regarding the value
of housing services, the ratio hr/~ is the key parameter which determines the homeownership rate
in our model. We choose to target this rate for working age households in the SCF. The average
homeownership rate for the 1989-2007 waves is 69.43 percent, and the implied value for hr/~ is
0.9992. We set the discount factor to match the median wealth to earnings ratio for working age
renters observed in the data. The average of this statistic in the SCF is 0.3450.
Regarding the matching technology, a larger value of γ reduces the severity of search and
matching frictions and, hence, median time to buy in the steady state. According to the NAR
median time to buy is between 10 to 12 weeks. Thus, we set γ so that the median time to buy in
the steady state is 11 weeks. We choose the owner occupied housing stock, H, to match the median
housing wealth to earnings ratio for working age owners in the SCF, which is 2.7223.
The real return to the risk-free asset, R, is such that its implicit annual return is equal to 3.91
percent, as calibrated in Díaz and Luengo-Prado (2010). The American Housing Survey reports
that the median housing cost for renters for the last 10 years is about 28 percent of income. This
includes the cost of maintenance and utilities. Thus, we take rh to be 25 percent of the monthly
wage. We follow Díaz and Luengo-Prado (2008) and set the tax on home purchases, τb, equal to
2.5 percent, and the tax on sales, τs, to 6 percent. The cost of posting a vacancy, κs, is set to zero.
The parameter δ, which corresponds to the down payment, is set to 0.5 to match the median
Loan To Value ratio observed in the Survey of Consumer Finances for working age households. The
average of this statistic for the 1989–2007 waves is 41.04 percent. The reason for this calibration
choice (instead of setting δ = 0.2, which is a more typical number in the literature) is to have a
meaningful tenure choice. Díaz and Luengo-Prado (2008) show that, in the absence of risk, all
households make the same tenure choice regardless of their wealth–they all either rent or own,
depending on the value of the user cost of owner occupied housing relative to the rental price of
housing. Here households do face idiosyncratic risk but this risk is so small that all households
participate in the afternoon market and end up owning a home for low values of δ. Will return to
this issue in Section 4.4.
We have assumed that immigrants own no residential assets. Since we do not have a sensible
way to calibrate the distribution of their financial assets, we assume that they all enter the location
with zero assets.
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4.3 The benchmark economy
We next discuss the main quantitative properties of our benchmark economy.
4.3.1 Household’s policy functions
It is useful to examine the household’s optimal decisions before discussing the main features of the
equilibrium. Panel (a) of Figure 4 depicts the price paid by buyers with different financial assets,
which is given by gp(a) ≡ p(gθ(a)). Panel (b) depicts the associated trading probabilities. Potential
buyers with financial assets below 1.4052 times annual earnings do not participate in the afternoon
market. We refer to a potential buyer with this threshold level of assets, apart, as the marginal
buyer. This buyer faces a binding borrowing constraint and directs her search to a submarket where
the price of a house is 2.6636 times her accumulated wealth. Upon completing a transaction, her
mortgage amounts to 1.325 times her annual earnings, which is the collateralized borrowing limit,
(1 − δ) p. The probability that she buys a home is only 0.0783 though. The borrowing constraint
binds for any buyer with financial wealth below 1.4641 times annual earnings. For constrained
buyers, the probability of buying a home rises very rapidly with a. For instance, it reaches 0.3573
for the threshold level of assets above which the borrowing constraint no longer binds. Any buyer
whose wealth is greater than 2.8795 times annual earnings buys a home upfront and does not get a
mortgage loan. A buyer whose wealth is equal to this level completes a sale with probability 0.4455
and pays 2.78 times her annual earnings for the house.
Let us turn to the renters’ night savings decision. As we can see in panel (c) of Figure 4,
consumption falls with assets for poor renters (as they save to buy a home). As soon as they have
accumulated enough assets to participate in the frictional market, consumption starts rising with
assets. For instance, a renter with zero assets has to wait for 7.58 years to become a marginal buyer.
In the event that she does not complete a purchase (the most likely event for a marginal buyer),
she will increase her savings further and will direct her search to a submarket with a higher price in
the following period, where the probability of trading is higher. This probability rises slowly with a
for high wealth levels though, as shown in panel (b) of Figure 4. This and the fact that households
discount the future imply that the savings policy function of a renter is smooth and standard for
levels of financial assets above apart. This function has a fixed point: renters whose financial assets
are 1.4739 times their annual earnings consume their income and role over their wealth. Any renter
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with more assets depletes them as the probability of buying is not large enough to compensate for
lower non-housing consumption. The renter at the fixed point (whose assets are 1.4739 times her
annual earnings) directs her search to the submarket where the price is 2.7277 times her annual
earnings and gets a mortgage below her borrowing limit. This also implies that, at a steady state,
the support of the financial wealth distribution of renters is the interval [0, 1.4739 × 12w]. The
support is so compressed because the probability of buying, mb, rises very slowly with a for high
wealth levels. For instance, the largest point of the grid is equal to 20 times annual earnings. A
renter so rich directs her search to a submarket where the price is 3 times her annual earnings and
mb is 0.6955. The elasticity of mb(θ) is then key to determine the support of the financial wealth
distribution of renters and, therefore, that of the price distribution in the frictional market.
Consider now the owners’ saving decisions. We do not show their savings policy function because
it is very smooth and concave, as owners are hit by a mistmatch or a moving shock only every 10
years on average. Since the model period is a month, their behavior is very similar to the case
in which they face no idiosyncratic risk at all. The fixed point of their savings policy function
corresponds to a value of a equal to -1.0441 times their annual earnings. Hence, in equilibrium
all owners hold debt. Yet their net worth—the value of all assets minus liabilities—is positive, for
the following reason. Take a home buyer who exhausts the borrowing limit and becomes an owner
with a mortgage equal to (1 − δ) p. In equilibrium, the Walrasian price equals 2.65 times annual
earnings, and recall that δ = 0.5. Valuing her home at this price, the owner’s net worth is equal
to δ p, which amounts to 1.3250 times her earnings. Yet, if she sells her home, she will have to pay
τs p in taxes. Hence, her liquid wealth is (δ − τs) p, which is 1.1660 times her earnings. An owner
whose assets equal -1.0441 times her earnings (the fixed point of the policy function) holds a net
worth, a+ p, equal to 1.6059 times her earnings, whereas her liquid wealth is 28.09 percent of her
earnings.
To sum up, in this economy renters hold positive financial assets and all owners hold debt.
Renters accumulate assets to finance a down payment. This is so because the probability that
owners are hit by a shock is low and so is the interest rate of mortgages, R− 1, (given the discount
factor β). In terms of net worth, owners’ wealth is much more concentrated than that of renters
(who only hold financial wealth).
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4.3.2 Aggregate implications
Table 2 shows some selected targeted statistics of the benchmark economy. The homeownership
rate is 69.43 percent, as in the data. The median of housing wealth to annual earnings ratio for
working age owners in the data is 2.72. We take as the model counterpart for median housing
wealth the median price paid by home buyers in the frictional market; the ratio of this median
price to annual earnings also equals 2.72. The median Loan To Value Ratio in the model (and in
the data) is calculated in the following way. We take the (working age) owners who hold negative
financial assets (mortgages in the data). We then calculate the median of their financial assets and
divide them by the median housing wealth. This statistic in the data is 41.04, whereas in the model
it is 38.68 percent. The median wealth to earnings ratio for renters is 0.35 in the data, and 0.28 in
the model, which is a bit low. But recall that we are assuming away any income risk that would
result in precautionary savings. The median time to buy is 11.56 weeks in the frictional market,
which is within the range of about 10–12 weeks reported by NAR.28
We next analyze the implications of the model for some key non targeted statistics. Take the
rent-to-price ratio, a typical index used to measure the return to housing. According to Sommer
and Sullivan (2018), in the data this ratio is between 8 and 15 percent. To calculate the equivalent
statistic in the model we need to take a stand on which is the reasonable statistic for house prices.
On the one hand, houses are sold at price p in the Walrasian market. On the other hand, we have
the cross-sectional house price distribution in the frictional market. Note that, regardless of its
purchasing price, the liquidation value of a house is p. This is why we report the rent-to-price ratio
as the annual rent divided by p. This ratio is 9.43 percent in the steady state, which is within the
range reported by Sommer and Sullivan (2018).
Consider now average time on the market (TOM), a typical index of housing market liquidity.
Recall that the probability that a house is sold during the afternoon and thus average TOM varies
across submarkets. Also, intermediaries who do not sell their units can always choose to join
a different submarket in next period. All these intermediaries face the same (ex-ante) expected
probability of selling in next period. Therefore, we can calculate the expected TOM associated
to the decision to join a particular submarket. The median of the distribution of this variable is
28For each potential buyer with assets a ≥ apart, we calculate time to buy taking into account the fact that, if the
buyer does not trade this period, she will have more assets in the next period and will then direct her search to a
submarket with a higher trading probability.
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10.26 weeks, which is within the range of 4 to 17 weeks reported by NAR. Another index of market
liquidity is months supply, which is the ratio of vacancies over sales in a given month (e.g. see
Hedlund, 2016b). In the data, the average of this ratio was 5.47 in 2017 according to NAR, whereas
in our model it is 2.61. Finally, the model’s vacancy rate matches that in the data although we
have not used this statistic as a target.29 In sum, the model does a good job in matching aggregate
features of the housing market and household’s portfolio in spite of its simplicity.
4.3.3 The distribution of prices and wealth
In this subsection we analyze the distributional implications of the model. As explained in Section
4.3.1, the equilibrium price distribution in the afternoon market is very compressed. The associ-
ated standard deviation is around 1 percent (see Table 2). This is mainly because agents face a
tiny amount of idiosyncratic risk. In particular, there are no differences in labor earnings across
households, which would propagate to the wealth distribution (in the absence of complete markets)
and, from the latter, to the price distribution.
There are many empirical studies that suggest that frictional dispersion in housing prices is
significant, as discussed in the Introduction, but we do not have many estimates of it. For instance,
Lisi and Iacobini (2013) estimate an hedonic pricing model using Canadian data controling for
residual price dispersion (i.e., not explained by hedonic housing attributes). They find that the
mean of the prediction error falls from 16.50 to 14.15 percent when taking into account residual
dispersion, whereas its standard deviation falls from 14.62 to 12.37 percent. We thus take the
difference from 16.50 to 14.15 as an estimate of the mean prediction error due to frictional price
dispersion; this number is 2.35 percent. Likewise, we take as an estimate of the standard deviation
of the prediction error the difference 14.62 – 12.47, which is 2.25. The mean prediction error in
our benchmark economy is 0.8489 percent (see Table 2), which accounts for 36.12 percent of the
estimate by Lisi and Iacobini (2013). The coefficient of variation of prices is 0.9269 percent, which
is about 42 percent of the dispersion not explained by observables in their paper.30
Another source of information on frictional price dispersion comes from Zillow, the online US
29The vacancy rate and months supply go hand in hand in the model (so it is impossible to get both statistics right
simultaneously).
30Previous work by these authors applies the same methodology to a rich Italian dataset which includes information
about both buyers and sellers (see Lisi and Iacobini (2012)). There they find that the standard error that can be
attributed to frictional dispersion is about 4.56 percent for a sample of selected Italian cities.
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real estate database. Zillow’s methodology is applied to homogeneous sets of homes in a given
geographical segment and combines information about physical attributes of the home and the
land, among other things.31 As reported in their website, at the national level “Zillow’s accuracy
has a median error rate of 5 percent. This means half of the home values in the segment are closer
than the error percentage and half are farther off.” Median errors are also reported at the county
and MPA level, with substantial variation across segments for which enough data are available.
For instance, for top metropolitan areas, median errors lie between 3 and 7 percent.32 If a home’s
sale price is different from the Zestimate, we can attribute part of the difference to the presence
of search and matching frictions in the housing market. To construct a model counterpart for this
estimate, we calculate the average price in the afternoon market, which is 2 percent higher than the
Walrasian price. Since the distribution of prices is very compressed, all house prices lie within a 5
percent range of the average price. Nevertheless, 59.25 percent lie out of the 1 percent range. The
fact that we cannot match the magnitude of Zillow’s error is also consistent with the widely held
view that unobserved heterogeneity must explain part of the residual dispersion in house prices.
Yet our comparable statistic is about the same order of magnitude, which leads us to conjecture
that frictional dispersion may be a substantial part of the overall residual dispersion.
Recall that all immigrants enter the economy with zero assets. Because of sorting, poorer
buyers trade with a lower probability in the frictional market and accumulate higher wealth to
access a submarket where they are more likely to trade. This behavior and the turnover due to
the preference and mobility shocks generate a non-degenerate distribution of financial assets. The
Gini coefficient for renters’ wealth is 0.5345, which is pretty high; Díaz and Luengo-Prado (2010)
report a coefficient of 0.89 in the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances. Valuing homes at price p,
the Gini of wealth for the total population is 0.2221. This is significant for a setting with such a
tiny amount of uncertainty if we consider that the typical Gini coefficient for household wealth in
the US is about 0.8 (see Díaz and Luengo-Prado, 2010).
It will be useful to compare our results with those of Eerola and Maattanen (2018) at this
point. This should be done with caution since their environment is quite different. Specifically,
31Several recent studies on housing use data from Zillow and other similar websites. Piazzesi et al. (2015) document
differential search patterns by buyers at the ZIP code level using data from California’s website Trulia, and argue
that these differential patterns can explain differences in the prices of houses with similar characteristics across ZIP
codes. Guerrieri et al. (2013) study the link between within-city migration, different house price dynamics across
neighborhoods, and gentrification.
32Median errors lie between 4 and 13 percent for 75 percent of the counties (if one restricts to counties for which
at least 80% of the observations include sale prices). See https://www.zillow.com/zestimate/
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their random search and bargaining model features two-sided risk aversion as home buyers and
sellers trade directly with each other (there is no intermediation), and it is not block recursive
because agents need to guess the entire wealth distribution to take decisions (which highly limits
its computational tractability). Whereas matching probabilities are exogenous, not all matches
between buyers and sellers lead to trade. Thus buying times and TOM depend on the fraction
of successful matches.33 Additionally, their model features idiosyncratic labor income risk. The
coefficient of variation of prices in our stationary equilibrium is twice the level they report. Yet we
do not know how much of this difference is due to the random search assumption and how much is
due to two-sided risk aversion.
4.4 Comparative statics
We now discuss the steady state effects of changes in some parameters of interest. To understand
better these results, it is instructive to compare our economy with an alternative one where the stock
of owner-occupied housing is allowed to respond to market conditions. The alternative economy
is constructed in the following way. We fix p at its stationary value in our model, and assume
that intermediaries who enter the economy can build a house at cost p before the afternoon market
opens. We refer to this as the construction economy, as opposed to our economy with a fixed
housing stock. As we discussed at the beginning of Section 4.1, this alternative economy parallels
directed search models of the labor market where firms create a vacancy by a paying an exogenous
cost. This cost in turn determines the relationship between tightness levels and equilibrium prices
(the equivalent of our price schedule, p(θ)). The difference is that here the cost, p, is endogenous.
4.4.1 Changes in credit conditions
We first inspect the role of credit. Consider a reduction in the down payment. Such a reduction eases
financial constraints for two reasons. First, it reduces the amount of equity needed to participate
in the frictional market and, second, it increases liquidity of residential assets allowing owners to
smooth non-housing consumption against their housing collateral. Notice that since there is no
capital in our setup the size of the economy is not affected.
33By contrast, in our model matching probabilities are endogenous because they depend on the tightness in the
different active submarkets, but all matches lead to trade.
29
Table 3 describes the effects of a 10 percent reduction (increase) in δ, from 0.5 to 0.45 percent
(0.55 percent, respectively). As shown in columns two and five, this produces about a 10 percent
change of the opposite sign in the Walrasian price. Consider the case of a reduction in δ. It is
instructive to look at Figure 5(a) first, which plots the equilibrium prices as a function of the
assets of the buyers who participate in the frictional market. The reduction in δ affects this
function in three ways. First, the function shifts upwards (from the benchmark blue curve marked
as δ = 50% to the red one marked as δ = 45%), as all participating buyers can afford to pay a
higher price. Second, its domain widens as poorer potential buyers can now participate (apart falls).
Third, its shape changes, becoming more concave for high levels of assets. This is so because the
probability of buying is an increasing concave function of the price and the households’ marginal
utility is decreasing. The combination of these two factors implies that, when δ falls, all buyers who
participate are willing to pay higher prices, but the effect is stronger for poorer buyers. The three
effects, combined with the endogenous change in the wealth distribution, determine the Walrasian
price as well as the mean and variance of prices in the frictional market in the new steady state.
Figure 5(b) shows expected buying times as a function of a. This function also shifts (from the
blue to the red curve) and becomes flatter for high levels of financial assets. Its domain, again,
becomes wider, and there is an upward shift for high levels of assets so that buying times are slightly
longer for wealthier buyers (with respect to the benchmark). The latter change follows because
more buyers participate and they are all willing to pay higher prices, resulting in an increase in
congestion in more expensive submarkets.
The overall effect of a 10 percent reduction in δ is a 10 increase in the Walrasian price, a rise
in the median time to buy from 11.5670 to 12.0780 weeks, and a fall in price dispersion. In Table
3 we report three different measures of dispersion. The first is the coefficient of variation of prices,
which falls from 0.92995 to 0.5065 percent. The second is the percentage of transaction prices out
of the 1 percent range of the average price, which falls from 59.2480 to 42.9450 percent. The last
one is the price range, which measures the ratio of the highest to the lowest price. Interestingly,
this statistic rises from 1.0241 to 1.0741. The overall price dispersion falls because the renters’
wealth distribution changes and also because of the aforementioned change in the shape of the
price function. As we can see, the Gini coefficient of renters’ wealth falls a bit from 0.5345 to
0.5275. The Gini coefficient for owners’ wealth, however, does not change. While all owners hold
more debt (the median Loan-To-Value ratio rises from 38.6840 to 43.8840 percent), their housing
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wealth is higher too (the median housing wealth to earnings ratio increases from 2.7049 to 2.9712),
compensating their higher indebtedness. Finally, as median time to buy rises, median TOM and
the vacancy rate fall, so the market becomes more liquid. Note that the homeownership rate rises
slightly from 69.4280 to 69.4850. This is consistent with the fact that the participation rate rises
moderately and buying times increase.
The opposite case where the credit conditions tighten (as δ rises from 50% to 55%) is sym-
metric in terms of its aggregate effects (see Table 3). The Walrasian price falls by 10% and the
homeownership rate falls a slightly. The asymmetries show up in Figures 5(a) and 5(b) though.
When δ rises, the curve which gives the equilibrium afternoon prices as a function of the buyers’
assets shifts down and its support narrows (due to lower participation). The function also becomes
steeper. This is so because buyers shift to submarkets with lower prices, higher congestion and
longer time to buy (they move to the elastic part of mb(p)). This results in an increase in price
dispersion, as measured by the coefficient of variation, as the Gini coefficient of renters’ wealth also
rises. Median time to buy falls and the market becomes less liquid, with more vacancies and higher
median TOM.
To have a sense of the importance of assuming a fixed housing stock, we also report the cor-
responding effects in the construction economy. The effect of a 10 percent decrease in δ in this
economy is shown in column 3 of Table 3. The Walrasian price does not change (by assumption),
but there is a large effect on distributional statistics. In particular, unlike in our benchmark, the
homeownership rate is very sensitive to credit conditions. This rate rises from 69.4280 to 76.2090
percent, as housing becomes more affordable (the rent-to-price ratio increases), but neither time to
buy nor TOM change. This is because the infinitely elastic supply of housing is effectively undoing
the congestion effect brought about by the increase in housing demand. The Gini coefficient of
renters’ wealth falls significantly because buying times are shorter than in the benchmark econ-
omy. Consider now to the case where δ rises to 55%. In this case no renter wants to buy a house
anymore, since they do not want to sacrifice non-housing consumption to build the high down
payment. Hence, there are no home owners in the new steady state and the Gini coefficient of
renters’ wealth is zero, since renters do not face any risk. This exercise shows in a stark way that
the congestion in the frictional market combined with an inelastic housing supply endogenously
generates a significant amount of wealth heterogeneity.
To assess the quantitative significance of our results one should keep in mind that required
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down payments fell from about 20 to 1 percent during the period prior to the Great Recession,
whereas the price-to-rent ratio, as reported by Favilukis et al. (2017), increased between 30 and 49
percent, depending on the price index used. Thus, a 95 percent fall in the down payment implied
about a 40 percent increase in the price-to-rent ratio. In our benchmark, a 10 percent reduction
in the down payment produces about a 9 percent change in the price-to-rent ratio (the inverse of
the statistic reported in row seven of Table 3). These numbers suggest that the competitive search
mechanism over-amplifies the effects of changes in financial conditions, but we should bear in mind
that we are assuming a fixed housing stock and we are abstracting from idiosyncratic labor risk.
It is useful to compare our results with those in Eerola and Maattanen (2018), who do allow for
idiosyncratic income risk. These authors find that a 10 percent reduction in the down payment
from 95 to 85 percent brings about a rise of 6 percent in the average housing price. It should be
noted that, due to the complexity of computing their model, the homeownership rate is kept fixed
in their quantitative analysis. These authors also find, as we do, that tightening credit conditions
reduces liquidity (measured by average TOM) and increases price dispersion.
Our results stand in contrast with some of important results in the heterogeneous agents litera-
ture, which assumes a Walrasian (centralized) housing market where agents trade instantaneously
at the equilibrium prices. For instance, Kiyotaki et al. (2011) and Sommer et al. (2013) find that
changes in financial conditions have negligible effects on housing prices. The reason is that easing
financial conditions affects only constrained agents, which represent a small fraction of the house-
holds in the economy. This is so in spite of the fact that Sommer et al. (2013) also assume a fixed
housing stock. These authors find that the homeownership rate varies significantly, though, as in
our construction economy. Favilukis et al. (2017) stress the importance of housing risk affecting all
agents regardless of their wealth, along with a sufficiently high heterogeneity, for financial condi-
tions to have a sizable aggregate effect on housing prices. They find that, in a model economy with
these ingredients, a down payment reduction from 25 to 1 percent produces a 20 percent increase in
the price-to-rent ratio. In Favilukis et al. (2017) housing risk is a byproduct of aggregate risk. Their
main insight is that the combination of housing risk and high heterogeneity produces a significant
number of “constrained” agents, which is the key for changes in financial conditions to affect prices.
Housing risk is indeed an essential part of our search environment: buyers purchase a home with
certain probability and all home owners face a probability of realizing capital losses. Since search is
directed, agents can affect the amount of risk they face through their savings and search decisions.
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In particular, the severity of search and matching frictions affects the households saving decisions
and thus the wealth distribution. Additionally, as we have seen, there is also a feedback effect from
the wealth distribution to the frictions agents face in the housing market. The key point is that,
in the language of the heterogeneous agents literature, all home buyers are effectively constrained
in our model. When given one more euro, they all direct their search towards a submarket with a
higher price, even if they do not face a binding credit constraint. This is why changes in financial
conditions have such a large impact on the average housing price in our economy. This mechanism
operates through the inherent heterogeneity of the economy which search and matching frictions
generate. This is clear when we look at the exercises where no agent wants to buy a home; when
all households are renters all of them hold the same level of wealth.
Our amplification mechanism critically relies on the inelasticity of the housing supply. Our
results are consistent with Favara and Imbs (2015), who are able to identify a credit supply shock
using US county and bank branches data for the period 1994-2005, and find that the response of
prices to a credit shock depends on the response of the housing stock. There are many studies
estimating housing supply elasticities. For instance, Green et al. (2005) or Gyourko et al. (2013)
show that estimates of housing supply vary widely across cities depending on land abundance and
particular regulation in each area. Moreover, they find that the cities which experienced a higher
price boom were those with a low elasticity of housing supply and high income growth.
4.4.2 Other comparative static exercises
For the sake of completeness, we also report the steady state effects of a permanent change in the
wage, the rental housing price, transaction taxes, and the interest rate in Table 4. The effect of a
5 percent increase in the wage, w, is reported in the third column. The first thing that stands out
is the 9.42 percent increase in the Walrasian price. The effect on the rest of the variables is very
similar to that of a reduction in the down payment. This may be surprising since, unlike a change
in credit conditions, a change in the wage does affect the size of the economy. The reason the effect
is so similar is that this is a partial equilibrium economy: we are ignoring the general equilibrium
effects on production of the non-housing good and the interest rate. There is a difference, though,
regarding the effect on the Median Loan To Value ratio, whose change after a rise in w is negligible
and depends directly on the credit constraint. Additionally, a permanent change in the wage has,
in relative terms, a larger effect on prices. All this suggests that changes in aggregate productivity,
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combined with an easing of credit conditions, should have a significant impact on housing prices.
It is worth mentioning that changes in transaction taxes—specially taxes on home purchases—
have also a sizable effect on the Loan To Value Ratio. Finally, a reduction on the return to financial
assets produces a small reduction in the Walrasian price as well as a corresponding increase in the
homeownership rate. The effect on the price seems counterintuitive, but recall that agents do not
face any income risk. Thus, if the interest rate falls, they change the composition of consumption:
they consume more non-housing good. As a result, they save less and house prices fall.
5 Final comments
The key message that we want to convey is that changes in financial conditions and other shocks
that affect housing demand, which typically do not have significant quantitative effects in standard
heterogeneous agents models, are highly amplified in the presence of search and matching frictions.
We have developed a tractable framework to study how the interaction between search and
matching and credit frictions and risk aversion jointly determines the price level and the degree
of price dispersion in housing markets. We have assumed that owners are subject to idiosyncratic
preference and moving shocks to generate housing turnover. Mismatched owners sell their home
(without delays) in a Walrasian market intermediaries with linear transferable utility, who in turn
sell the units to home buyers in a competitive search market. Households who own no residential
assets do not face any exogenous risk: they have to move, but doing so is costless. The only
uncertainty faced by non owners is that, if they choose to buy a home, they may be rationed in the
search market.
Since search is directed, home buyers can ameliorate this uncertainty by directing their search
towards more expensive submarkets where they are more likely to trade. This mechanism generates
positive sorting in equilibrium, meaning that buyers with higher financial wealth pay higher prices
and trade faster. Critically, in our theory, the average housing price depends crucially on the differ-
ential way in which the degree of market liquidity affects buyers with different financial wealth. The
mechanism also creates wealth inequality: as potential buyers wait to find a trading opportunity,
they save more to avoid queues. This is explains the connection between financial wealth distri-
bution and the house price distribution. For instance, tightening credit increases wealth inequality
34
and housing price dispersion and reduces the average housing price significantly. It also reduces
housing market liquidity. The endogenous participation choice is key for our results, as we have
seen. Our analysis also suggests that one should bare in mind that the effects of aggregate changes
of this kind –and, in particular, the effects on liquidity and the distributional effects– critically
depend on how whether or not the housing stock can adjust to those changes.34
We have made a number of strong simplifying assumptions. First of all, we have abstracted
away from idiosyncratic labor income risk in order to study the amplification channel implied by
competitive search. Second, in our setting mismatched owners can sell their property in a Walrasian
housing market (where there is neither price dispersion nor trading delays). This eliminates part of
the congestion that search and matching frictions create. This margin is important to understand
why owners hold so little wealth in our model economy. Third, we have studied two extreme
cases: an economy with a fixed housing stock and one in which the supply of housing is infinitely
elastic. Both economies deliver strikingly different effects of changes in financial conditions and
other shocks. The key issue that remains is the empirically relevant elasticity of supply.
We have also focused our attention on steady states. Studying the transitional dynamics of our
model is not trivial, for the following reason. In our benchmark, the Walrasian price is endogenous.
Out of the steady state this price depends not only on current economic conditions but also on
expectations about future market liquidity. If potential buyers expect higher prices tomorrow they
will start directing their search towards submarkets with higher prices today. Thus, expectations
should play a key role out of the steady state. In the construction economy we have studied
—which parallels directed search models of the labor market such as Menzio and Shi (2010) and
Chaumont and Shi (2018)— this expectations effect is absent because, in equilibrium, the Walrasian
price equals the fixed cost of building a house. We leave all these interesting extensions for future
research.
34It is well-known that housing supply restrictions are key to understand housing markets (e.g. see Davis and
Heathcote, 2005), and the increase in the overall housing price dispersion in the US, in particular (see Nieuwerburgh
and Weill, 2010; Gyourko et al., 2013; Albouy and Zabek, 2016).
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A Properties of the value functions
Let a denote the household’s assets in a given subperiod (either night or afternoon). Recall that
A = [a,∞) and let C(A) be the space of continuous functions f : A→ R, and E = C(A)× C(A).
Define the Bellman operator T on E by T = (To, Tr), where
To(fo, fr)(a) = max
c,a′
{
u (c, ~) + β (1− piξo) (1− piµ) fo (a′)
+β [1− (1− piξo) (1− piµ)] Tb(fo, fr) (a′ + (1− τs) p)
}
s.t. c+ 1R a′ ≤ w + a,
a′ ≥ −(1− δ) p,
c ≥ 0,
(A.1)
Tr(fo, fr)(a) = max
c,a′
{
u (c, hr) + β Tb(fo, fr) (a′)
}
s.t. c+ 1R a′ ≤ w − rh + a,
a′ ≥ 0,
c ≥ 0,
(A.2)
and where Tb(fo, fr) is defined by
Tb(fo, fr)(a) = max
{
max
θ∈D(a)
{
mb (θ) fo (a− (1 + τb) p(θ)) + (1−mb (θ)) fr (a)
}
, fr(a)
}
. (A.3)
The feasible correspondence D of the inner maximization problem in (A.3) is defined by
D(a) = {θ ∈ R+ : a− (1 + τb)p(θ) + (1− δ)p ≥ 0} for a ∈ A. (A.4)
If D(a) = ∅, we attach the value −∞ to participation, and thus Tb(fo, fr)(a) = fr(a) in this case.
Also, since
p(θ) = κs + (1− β)p
ms (θ)
+ βp for all θ ∈ R+, (A.5)
limθ→∞ p(θ) = pmin. Since p is decreasing, D(a) 6= ∅ if and only if a > (1 + τb)pmin − (1− δ)p ≥ 0.
Since p is continuous in R++, D has closed sections. However, D(a) is not compact. To circumvent
this problem and be able to apply Bergé’s Maximum Theorem, we assume that agents choose mb
rather than θ. Let
pˆ(mb) =
κs + (1− β) p
mˆs (mb)
+ β p for mb ∈ (0, 1), (A.6)
and pˆ(0) = pmin. The function pˆ is continuous in [0, 1), since it is the composition of two continuous
functions when 0 < mb < 1, and, for mb = 0, limmb→0+ pˆ(mb) = limθ→∞ p(θ) = pmin. Also, since
mˆs is strictly decreasing and −mˆs′/mˆs is non decreasing, pˆ is strictly increasing and strictly convex.
Finally, limmb→1− pˆ(mb) = limθ→0+ p(θ) = ∞. By choosing mb as the new decision variable, the
feasible correspondence D becomes D, as defined by
D(a) = {mb ∈ [0, 1) : a− (1 + τb) pˆ(mb) + (1− δ) p ≥ 0}. (A.7)
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The sections of D are nonempty and compact for a − (1 + τb) pˆ(mb) + (1 − δ) p > 0. In fact,
when nonempty, D(a) is the bounded and closed interval
[
0, pˆ−1
(
a+(1−δ) p
1+τb
)]
. Problem (A.3) thus
transforms into
Tb(fo, fr)(a) = max
{
max
mb∈D(a)
{
mb fo (a− (1 + τb) pˆ(mb)) + (1−mb) fr (a)
}
, fr(a)
}
. (A.8)
In Theorem 1 below, we assume that a positive level of consumption is always possible for
both owners and renters. Since an initial wealth of a = a is admissible at the initial state, a
positive consumption in the first period for owners and renters implies w + a + (1−δ)pR > 0 and
w − rh + a > 0, respectively. In particular, the first inequality implies w −
(
1− 1R
)
(1 − δ)p > 0,
which means that the owner can sustain a strictly positive level of consumption at the borrowing
limit. Another consequence of the above inequalities is that no = u
(
w + a+ (1−δ) pR , ~
)
> −∞ and
n1 = u(w− rh + a, hr) > −∞. This follows because the utility function u(c, h) is finite if c > 0, for
h ∈ {~, hr}. On the other hand, utilities may be unbounded from above. Hence, we need to control
for their rate of growth on the feasible correspondence, as well as for the size of β, to guarantee that
the dynamic programming equations define a contraction operator. Consider the number sequence
{a0, a1, . . . , aj , . . .}, where
aj =
(
Rw
R− 1 + a
)
Rj − Rw
R− 1 , j = 0, 1, 2, . . . . (A.9)
Note that a ≤ aj ≤ aj+1, aj →∞ as j →∞, and a0 = a. Let
uoj = max
a∈[a,aj ]
∣∣∣∣u(w + a+ (1− δ)pR , ~
)∣∣∣∣ ,
urj = max
a∈[a,aj ]
|u (w − rh + a, hr)| ,
and uj = max{uoj , urj}. Note that both uoj and urj are well defined because n = min{no, nr} > −∞.
Define
vj :=
∞∑
i=j
βi−juj , for j = 0, 1, 2, . . .. (A.10)
The following theorem establishes the existence of a unique solution to the Bellman equation in a
suitable class of functions. The result covers both the bounded and unbounded from below cases.
Theorem 1. Suppose that n > −∞ and that
lim
j→∞
uj+1
uj
:= u < 1
β
. (A.11)
Then, the dynamic programming equations (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) admit unique continuous solu-
tions Wo, Wr and Wb, respectively, in the class of functions F defined by
F =
{
f ∈ C(A) : f(a) ≥ n1− β , for all a ∈ A, maxa∈[a,aj ] f(a) ≤ vj , for all j = 0, 1, . . .
}
. (A.12)
Moreover, both Wo and Wr are strictly increasing and Wb is non decreasing.
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Proof. Let (fo, fr) ∈ E. If a ≤ (1 + τb) pmin − (1 − δ)p then the agent’s optimal choice is θ0, and
so Tb(fo, fr)(a) = fr(a), which is continuous. When a > (1 + τb) pmin − (1 − δ) p, the function
(mb, a) 7→ mb fo (a− (1 + τb) pˆ(mb)) + (1−mb) fr (a) is continuous on (a,mb) ∈ A× [0, 1) and the
correspondence D defined in (A.7) is nonempty valued, compact valued, and continuous. Hence,
by the Theorem of the Maximum, the value function
max
mb∈D(a)
{
mb fo (a− (1 + τb) pˆ(mb)) + (1−mb) fr (a)
}
(A.13)
is continuous. Since Tb(fo, fr) is defined as the maximum between this value function and fr, it is
also continuous. It follows that the functions defining the right hand side of To(fo, fr) and Tr(fo, fr)
given in (A.1) and (A.2), respectively, are continuous. Moreover, the feasible correspondence is
nonempty valued, continuous and compact valued in both cases. Hence, by the Theorem of the
Maximum, both To(fo, fr) and Tr(fo, fr) are continuous. Let us see that Ti(F × F ) ⊆ F , for
i = o, r, b. Let (fo, fr) ∈ F × F . By the definition of Tb as the maximum of a convex combination
of fo and fr, it is clear that Tb(fo, fr) ≥ n1−β . Also,
To(fo, fr)(a) ≥ max
c,a′
u(c, ~)+β n1− β ≥ u
(
w + a+ (1− δ)p
R
, ~
)
+β n1− β ≥ n+β
n
1− β =
n
1− β ,
(A.14)
and
Tr(fo, fr)(a) ≥ max
c,a′
u(c, ~)+β n1− β ≥ u(w−rh+a, hr)+β
n
1− β ≥ n+β
n
1− β =
n
1− β . (A.15)
On the other hand,
Tb(fo, fr)(a) ≤ mb fo (a− (1 + τb) pˆ(mb)) + (1−mb) fr (a) ≤ mbvj + (1−mb)vj = vj (A.16)
and Tb(fo, fr)(a) ≤ fr(a) ≤ vj , for all a ∈ [a, aj ], for all j = 0, 1, . . .. Hence, given that for any
a ∈ [a, aj ], D(a) ⊆ [a, aj+1] by the definition of vj , we have
To(fo, fr)(a) ≤ uj + βvj+1 = vj , for all a ∈ [a, aj ]. (A.17)
By a similar computation, To(fo, fr)(a) ≤ vj for all a ∈ [a, aj ]. It thus follows that Ti(F ×F ) ⊆ F ,
for all i = o, r, b. Consider now C(A) with the topology generated by the countable family of
seminorms ‖f‖j = maxa∈[a,aj ] |f(a)|, for all j = 0, 1, . . .. This family is separated (‖f‖j = 0 for all
j implies that f is the null function). Since the compact intervals [a, aj ] form an increasing family
that covers A and they have nonempty interiors, the space C(A) is complete with this topology
(see Rincón-Zapatero and Rodríguez-Palmero, 2003). Consider the product space E = F ×F with
the seminorms ‖(fo, fr)‖j = max{‖fo‖j , ‖fr‖j}, for j = 0, 1, . . . and (fo, fr) ∈ E. It is clear that E
is complete with this topology, and that the set E is closed. Consider the series ∑∞j=0 c−juj , with
c > u, where u was defined in (A.11). By the ratio test and by (A.11)
lim
j→∞
c−(j+1)uj+1
c−juj
= u
c
< 1, (A.18)
so the series converges. Moreover, since β u < 1, it is possible to choose c > u with β c < 1.
Following Theorem 4 in RZRP (2003), T = (To, Tr) is a local contraction on F × F , so T admits a
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unique fixed point in F ×F , that is, there are unique Wo ∈ F , Wr ∈ F such that To(Wo,Wr) = Wo
and Tr(Wo,Wr) = Wr. Also, Tb(Wo,Wr) = Wb is the buyer’s value function.
To prove that Wo and Wr are strictly increasing, let a1 < a2. Then D(a1) ⊆ D(a2), since pˆ,
as the composition of two decreasing functions, is increasing. Let (fo, fr) ∈ E × E, where both fo
and fr are non decreasing. Then mb fo (a− (1 + τb) pˆ(mb)) + (1−mb) fr (a) is non decreasing in
a, since 0 ≤ mb < 1. Hence,
max
mb∈D(a1)
{
mb fo (a1 − (1 + τb) pˆ(mb)) + (1−mb) fr (a1)
}
≤ max
mb∈D(a1)
{
mb fo (a2 − (1 + τb) pˆ(mb)) + (1−mb) fr (a2)
}
≤ max
mb∈D(a2)
{
mb fo (a2 − (1 + τb) pˆ(mb)) + (1−mb) fr (a2)
}
.
It follows that Tb(fo, fr) is continuous and, being the maximum of two non decreasing functions, it
is also non decreasing. Plugging this result into the definitions of To and Tr, we get, by the same
reasoning, that both Tb(fo, fr) and Tr(fo, fr) are non decreasing, since the feasible correspondence
of both problems is increasing in a. Actually, both Tb(fo, fr) and Tr(fo, fr) are strictly increasing,
since the utility function u(w+a−a′/R, h) is increasing with respect to a, for h ∈ {hr, ~}. Finally,
the subset of F of non decreasing functions is closed in F , so the fixed points Wo, Wr and Wb are
non decreasing. However, in the case of Wo and Wr, they are increasing by the previous argument,
as they satisfy To(Wo,Wr) = Wo and Tb(Wo,Wr) = Wb, respectively.
It is direct to show that the general theorem above applies, among others, to the utility functions
used in the calibration of the model.
Corollary 2. The conclusions of Theorem 1 hold under the same hypotheses, in the following cases.
1. u(c, h) = c
1−σ
1− σ + v(h), with σ > 1.
2. u(c, h) = c
1−σ
1− σ + v(h), with σ ≤ 1 and R
1−σβ < 1,
where v(h) < v(~). Note that σ = 1 corresponds to u(c, h) = log(c) + v(h).
Proof. We only need to show that (A.11) holds. Note that u(·, h) is increasing in cases 1 and 2.
When σ > 1, u is negative and bounded. The sequence {uj}, being increasing and bounded, then
converges and u = 1 < 1β . When σ < 1, u is positive but unbounded. In fact,
uoj = u
(
w + aj +
(1− δ)p
R
, ~
)
. (A.19)
Given the definition of aj , it is direct to see that
lim
j→∞
uoj+1
uoj
= lim
j→∞
φ
(
w + aj+1 + (1−δ)pR
)1−σ
+ v(~)
φ
(
w + aj + (1−δ)pR
)1−σ
+ v(~)
= R1−σ. (A.20)
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In the logarithmic case, where σ = 1, uoj is bounded by
∣∣∣log (w + aj + (1−δ)pR )∣∣∣ + |v(~)| for large
enough j. The ratio
| log (w + aj+1 + (1−δ)pR )|+ |v(~)|
| log (w + aj + (1−δ)pR )|+ |v(~)
(A.21)
tends to 1 as j →∞, so (A.11) is satisfied. A similar computation holds for urj .
B Differentiability, Euler equations and concavity
In this section we prove the differentiability of the value functions along the optimal policies. This
suffices to obtain the Euler equations; differentiability in the entire domain is not required. Other
approaches to prove differentiability of the value function in a non-concave framework are due to
Dechert and Nishimura (1983), Milgrom and Segal (2002), or Clausen and Strub (2016)), but do not
apply to our setting (for the same reasons they do not apply to the model of Menzio et al. (2013)).
Thanks to the results that we introduce in this section, we do not need to introduce lotteries but
work directly within the non concave framework. We show that the Euler equations still hold as
necessary conditions of optimality, so they can be used to compute the optimal policies. We are
also able to establish a link between the concavity of the value functions and the monotonicity of
the optimal consumption policies. Our results are based on the approach recently introduced in
Rincón-Zapatero (2019). However, this approach does no apply directly to the Bellman equations
satisfied by Wo, Wr and Wb, due to their particular structure, so we need to elaborate a bit more.
We introduce the concepts of Fréchet super– and subdifferentials of a function (F-superdifferential
and F-subdifferential, henceforth) to simplify the presentation and the proofs that follow. For a
continuous function f : Ω ⊆ Rn → R, where Ω is an open set, the vector p ∈ Rn belongs to
the F-superdifferential of f at x0 ∈ Ω, D+f(x0), if and only if there exists a continuous function
ϕ : Ω −→ R which is differentiable at x0 with Dϕ(x0) = p, f(x0) = ϕ(x0) and f − ϕ has a local
maximum at x0. Similarly, p ∈ Rn belongs to the F-subdifferential of f at x0 ∈ Ω, D−f(x0), if and
only if there exists a continuous function ϕ : Ω −→ R which is differentiable at x0 with Dϕ(x0) = p,
f(x0) = ϕ(x0) and f−ϕ has a local minimum at x0. D+f(x0) and D−f(x0) are closed convex (and
possible empty) subsets ofRn. Yet, if f is differentiable at x0, then both D+f(x0) and D−f(x0) are
nonempty and D+f(x0) = D−f(x0) = {Df(x0)}. Reciprocally, if for a function f , both D+f(x0)
and D−f(x0) are nonempty, then f is differentiable at x0 and D+f(x0) = D−f(x0) = {Df(x0)},
where Df denotes the derivative of f . Given two continuous functions f1 and f2, two nonnegative
numbers λ1 and λ2 and pi ∈ D+fi(x), for i = 1, 2, λ1p1 + λ2p2 ∈ D+(λ1f1 + λ2f2)(a). A simi-
lar proposition holds for D−. Another property that we will use is that, whenever x0 is a local
maximum of f in Ω, 0 ∈ D+f(x0). Finally, D+f(x0) 6= ∅ if the function f is concave. See, for
instance, Bardi and Capuzzo-Dolcetta (1997) for these and for other properties of the F-super– and
subdifferentials of a function.
The next theorem characterizes the F-differentials of the value function f(x) = maxy∈Γ(x) F (x, y),
where F : X × Y → R is continuous, with X,Y ⊆ Rn, and where Γ is a correspondence from X
to Y is nonempty, compact valued and continuous. The result is well known in the case in which
the correspondence Γ is constant (i.e., when Γ(x) = Y for all x ∈ X), but for the general case it is
a generalization of the Benveniste-Scheinkman envelope argument. We will apply the theorem to
show the validity of the Euler equations in our model, which is a non-trivial issue due to the lack
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of concavity.
Theorem 3. Consider the problem described above, f(x) = maxy∈Γ(x) F (x, y). Let x0 be an interior
point of X and y0 ∈ Γ(x0) satisfying: (i) f(x0) = F (x0, y0), and (ii) there is a ball B(x0, ε) in X
with center x0 and radius ε > 0, such that for all x ∈ B(x0, ε), y0 ∈ Γ(x). Then D−x F (x0, y0) ⊆
D−f(x0) and D+f(x0) ⊆ D+x F (x0, y0), where D±x F (x0, y0) denotes the F–upper/lower differential
of the function x 7→ F (x, y0).
Proof. By Bergé’s Theorem, f is continuous and the optimal policy correspondence is nonempty.
Assumptions (i) and (ii) ensure that the function x 7→ f(x) − F (x, y0) is well defined on the ball
B(x0, ε) and attains a local minimum at x0. If D−x F (x0, y0) is empty, then there is nothing to
prove. Suppose that it is nonempty. Let ϕ be continuous in B(x0, ε) and differentiable at x0 such
that F (x, y0) − ϕ(x) has a local minimum at x0 and F (x0, y0) = ϕ(x0). Then f(x) − ϕ(x) ≥
F (x, y0)−ϕ(x) ≥ 0 and f(x0)−ϕ(x0) = F (x0, y0)−ϕ(x0) = 0 by (i). Thus x0 is a local minimum
of f −ϕ, and so Dϕ(x0) ∈ D−f(x0). Now, if D+f(x0) = ∅ then D+f(x0) ⊆ D+x F (x0, y0), trivially.
If D+f(x0) 6= ∅, let ϕ be continuous in B(x0, ε) such that Dϕ(x0) ∈ D+f(x0) and f − ϕ has
a local maximum at x0, with (f − ϕ)(x0) = 0. Then F (x, y0) − ϕ(x) ≤ f(x) − ϕ(x) ≤ 0 =
F (x0, y0) − ϕ(x0), for all x ∈ B(x0, ε). Hence, x0 is a maximum of x 7→ F (x, y0) − ϕ(x), and so
Dϕ(x0) ∈ D+x F (x0, y0).
Remark 4. Note that (ii) is satisfied when (x0, y0) is an interior point of the graph of Γ, although
it may be fulfilled more generally, as we will show in our housing model. On the other hand,
D−x F (x0, y0) 6= ∅ implies D−x f(x0) 6= ∅. Hence, if f is concave then f is differentiable. This is the
classical envelope theorem of dynamic programming.
After this preliminary exposition, we turn to our specific problem, given by (A.1)–(A.3). In the
results that follow, we will assume that there are selections of gao , gar and gθb such that gao and gar
are interior, and
0 ≤ gθ(a) < p−1
(
a
1 + τb
)
, (B.1)
for all a ∈ A. Hence, we do not assume uniqueness of the optimal policies.
Define amin = (1 + τb) pmin − (1 − δ) p. This is the threshold value of a above which D(a), as
defined in (A.4), is nonempty. Denote by apart > amin the maximum a > amin such that gθ(a) = θ0
for amin < a ≤ apart (if it exists).
Our strategy for proving that the value functions are differentiable at the optimal policies
consists on showing that both the F-subdifferential and the F-superdifferential are nonempty along
the optimal policies. This is the content of the results that follow. As a byproduct, we prove that
the Euler equations hold. We use this result in our computation (see Section D.3).
Lemma 5. Let a0 > a. Then (i) uc(gco(a0), ~) ∈ D−Wo(a0), and (ii) uc(gcr(a0), hr) ∈ D−Wr(a0).
Proof. We only prove (i), since the proof of (ii) is similar. Wo satisfies the Bellman equation (A.1).
Since gao (a0) is interior, given that the feasible correspondence is a closed interval, there is an open
interval I centered at a0, such that gao (a) ∈ (−(1− δ)p,R(w+ a)) for all a ∈ I. Thus (i) and (ii) in
Theorem 3 hold. Moreover, taking α = (1− piξo) (1− piµ), the function
F (a, gao (a0)) = u (w + a− gao (a0)/R, ~) + β αWo (gao (a0)) + β (1− α) Wb (gao (a0) + p) ,
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is differentiable with respect to a, with derivative uc(gco(a0), ~) at a = a0, as the second and
third summands in the definition of F are constant. Theorem 3 then implies uc(gco(a0), ~) ∈
D−Wo(a0).
To explore whether D−Wb is nonempty, we rewrite the problem of a potential buyer in an
equivalent form. Let
W (a,mb) =
{
Wr(a), if a ≤ amin, mb ∈ [0, 1],
mb (Wo(a− (1 + τb)pˆ(mb))−Wr(a)) +Wr(a), if a > amin, mb ∈ D(a), (B.2)
where D(a) is defined in (A.7). Let D˜(a) = {0} for a ≤ amin, and D˜(a) = D(a) for a > amin. The
correspondence D˜ is nonempty, compact valued and continuous. Formally, we are identifying the
choice θ0 in the original problem with mb = 0. Given this, it is clear that the original problem is
equivalent to the new formulation: maxW (a,mb) subject to mb ∈ D˜(a). Note that W is piecewise
continuous and, when restricted to the graph of D˜, it is continuous. For, if (an, (mb)n) is a pair
of sequences converging to (amin,mb) along the graph of D˜, where mb ∈ [0, 1], then for an > amin,
(mb)n = p̂−1(an)→ p̂−1(amin) = 0, and for an < amin, (mb)n = 0. Hence,
W (an, (mb)n)→ 0(Wo(0)−Wr(amin)) +Wr(amin) = Wr(amin) = W (amin, 0), (B.3)
as n→∞. Since mb = 0 is feasible for any a and gθb (a) = 0 in the region a ≤ apart (if apart exists),
Wb(a) = Wr(a) in this region.
Lemma 6. Let a0 > a. Then D−Wb(a0) = D−Wr(a0), for a0 ≤ apart, and
mb
(
gθb (a0)
)
po +
(
1−mb
(
gθb (a0)
))
pr ∈ D−Wb(a0), (B.4)
for a0 > apart, where po = uc
(
gco(a0 − (1 + τb) p(gθb (a0))), ~
)
and pr = uc(gcr(a0), hr).
Proof. For a < a < apart,Wb(a) = Wr(a), so (i) is trivial. At a = apart, mb = 0 is the optimal choice
(it is the only feasible choice, given our reformulation of the problem). Although not interior to the
graph of D˜(a), this choice satisfies condition (ii) in Lemma 3, that is, 0 ∈ D˜(a) in a neighborhood
of apart (for all a, actually). Hence, D−Wb(apart) 6= ∅. Let a0 > apart. Since gθb is interior, the
optimal gmb(a0) is interior. Thus the function of a
F (a, gmb(a0)) = gmb(a0)Wo(a− (1 + τb)pˆ(gmb(a0))) + (1− gmb(a0))Wr(a)) (B.5)
is well defined in a suitable interval centered at a0. Moreover, D−a F (a0, gmb(a0)) 6= ∅. To see this,
take po ∈ D−Wo (a0 − (1 + τb) pˆ(gmb(a0))) and pr ∈ D−Wr(a0), which exist by Lemma 5. By one of
the properties mentioned just above Theorem 3, gmb(a0) po + (1− gmb(a0)) pr ∈ D−a F (a0, gmb(a0)),
or, equivalently,
mb
(
gθb (a0)
)
po +
(
1−mb
(
gθb (a0)
))
pr ∈ D−a F (a0, gθb (a0)), (B.6)
with po and pr as described in the statement of the lemma. Since D−a F (a0, gθb (a0)) ⊆ D−Wb(a0)
by Theorem 3, the result in the lemma holds.
The fact that the F-subdifferential of the value function is nonempty is not enough to get
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differentiability, since the value functions need not be concave. Below we follow the path initiated
in Rincón-Zapatero (2019) to prove differentiability in the absence of concavity, which uses the
optimality condition and the special structure of the Bellman equation. This will provide us with
conditions for the nonemptiness of the F-superdifferential of the value functions at the optimal
policies.
Lemma 7. Let a0 > a. Then uc(gcr(a0), hr) ∈ RβD+Wb(gar (a0)).
Proof. Consider the Bellman equation (A.2) and the function of a′ given by
F (a0, a′) := u(w − rh + a0 − a′/R, hr) + βWb(a′). (B.7)
Since gar (a0) is an interior optimum to the Bellman equation (A.2), 0 ∈ D+a′F (a0, gar (a0)). But, since
u is of class C1, D+a′F = {−uc/R}+ βD+Wb. Hence, −uc(gcr(a0), hr) ∈ RβD+Wb(gar (a0)).
Our next result shows that Wb is differentiable at the renter’s optimal policy, and establishes
the validity of the renter’s Euler equation.
Proposition 8. Let a > a. Then
(i) Wb is differentiable at gar (a);
(ii) the Euler equation
− uc(gcr(a), hr)
+Rβ
[
mb
(
gθb (a′)
)
uc
(
gco(a′ − (1 + τb) p(gθb (a′))), ~
)
+
(
1−mb
(
gθb (a′)
))
uc(gcr(a′), hr)
]
= 0
holds, where a′ = gar (a).
Proof. By Lemma 6 and Lemma 7, both the F-super– and the F-subdifferential ofWb are nonempty
at gar (a). Hence,Wb is differentiable at gar (a). The derivative is, on the one hand, the unique element
in D−Wb(gar (a)), that is, W ′b(gar (a)) = 1Rβuc(gcr(a), hr) and, on the other hand, the unique element
in D+Wb(gar (a)), that is
W ′b(gar (a)) = uc(gcr(a′), hr), (B.8)
for gar (a) ≤ apart, and
W ′b(gar (a)) = mb
(
gθb (a′)
) [
uc
(
gco(a′ − (1 + τb) p(gθb (a′))), ~
)
−uc(gcr(a′), hr)
]
+uc(gcr(a′), hr), (B.9)
for gar (a) > apart, where a′ = gar (a) in both (B.8) and (B.9). Since mb
(
gθb (apart)
)
= 0, (B.9)
encompasses (B.8). Equating 1Rβuc(gcr(a), hr) to (B.9), we obtain the renter’s Euler equation.
Proposition 9. Let a > apart. Then
(i) Wo is differentiable at gao (a);
(ii) the Euler equation
−uc(gco(a), ~) +Rβαuc(gcr(a′), ~) +Rβ(1− α)mb
(
gθb (a′)
)
uc
(
gco(a′ − (1 + τb) p(gθb (a′))), ~
)
+Rβ(1− α) (1−mb
(
gθb (a′)
)
)uc(gcr(a′), hr) = 0,
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holds, where a′ = gao (a) + p and α = (1− piξo) (1− piµ).
Proof. From (A.1), the function of a′
F (a, a′) = u(w + a− a′/R, ~) + β αWo
(
a′
)
+ β(1− α)Wb
(
a′ + p
)
(B.10)
satisfies 0 ∈ D+a′F (a, gao (a)). Since both u and Wb are differentiable,
−uc(gco(a), ~) +Rβ (1− α)W ′b(gao (a) + p) ∈ −Rβ αD+Wo(gao (a)),
so D+Wo is nonempty at gao (a). This, combined with Lemma 5, implies that Wo is differentiable
at gao (a0). Also, its derivative at this point is given, on the one hand, by uc(gco(a), ~), and, on the
other hand, by 1Rβαuc(gco(gao (a)), ~)− (1−α)α W ′b(gao (a)+p). Equating both expressions, and replacing
W ′b(gar (a)) by its value in (B.9), we obtain the Euler equation in (ii).
Now we study concavity. Concavity of the value functions is proved in intervals where the
optimal consumption policy of the renters is nondecreasing.
Proposition 10. Wb is concave in intervals I of the image of gar if and only if gcr is nondecreasing
in the preimage of this subset, (gar )−1(I).
Proof. Note that Wb is differentiable in I by Proposition 9. Also, if a′ ∈ I, there is a > a such
that a′ = gar (a) and W ′b(a′) = uc(gcr(θ), hr)/R by Lemma 5. Let a′i ∈ I and let ai > a such that
a′i = gar (ai), for i = 1, 2. Without loss of generality, suppose that a′1 > a′2. By the Mean Value
Theorem,
Wb(a′1)−Wb(a′2) = W ′b(θ′)(a′1 − a′2) =
1
R
uc(gcr(θ), hr)(a′1 − a′2), (B.11)
where a′2 < θ′ < a′1 and where θ′ = gar (θ). Since gar is nondecreasing, a2 < θ < a1, and since gcr is non
decreasing, gcr(a2) ≤ gcr(θ) ≤ gcr(a1). Now, u(·, hr) is concave, so uc(gcr(θ), hr) ≤ uc(gcr(a2), hr) =
RW ′b(a′2). Hence,
Wb(a′1)−Wb(a′2) ≤W ′b(a′2)(a′1 − a′2), (B.12)
and so Wb is concave in C. Obviously, the reasoning above is reversible.
Proposition 11. Let I be an interval of A such that gar (I) is an interval. Then Wr is strictly
concave in I if and only if gcr is nondecreasing in I.
Proof. Let a1, a2 ∈ I and let λ1, λ2 ∈ [0, 1]. Since gar (I) is convex, λ1a1 + λ2a2 ∈ I, λ1gar (a1) +
λ2gar (a2) ∈ gar (I). Also, (λ1a1 + λ2a2, λ1gar (a1) + λ2gar (a2)) belongs to the graph of the buyer’s
feasible correspondence, since it is convex. Moreover, Wb is concave in gar (I) by Proposition 10.
Then
Wr(λ1a1 + λ2a2) ≤ u(λ1a1 + λ2a2, λ1gar (a1) + λ2gar (a2), hr) + βWb(λ1gar (a1) + λ2gar (a2))
≤ λ1u(a1, gar (a1), hr) + λ2u(a2, gar (a2), hr) + βλ1Wb(gar (a1)) + βλ1Wb(gar (a1))
= λ1Wr(a1) + λ2Wr(a2),
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where we have used the fact that u is concave and Wb is concave in the image of gar . Hence, Wr is
concave in I. Strict concavity of Wr follows from strict concavity of u.
Proposition 12. Let I be an interval of A such that both gao (I) and gar (I) are intervals and
{p}+ gao (I) ⊆ gar (I). Then Wo is strictly concave in I
Proof. We use the fact that the restriction of the operator To to the set F is a contraction. This
restricted operator is defined in the obvious way. First, fix the buyer’s value function Wb which,
given the hypotheses of the proposition and Proposition 10, is concave in gar (I). The restricted
operator is then
T bo (fo)(a) = max
c,a′
{
U b(c, ~) + βαfo(a′)
}
, (B.13)
where U b(c, a′) = u(c, ~)+β(1−α)Wb(a′+p) is strictly concave, and α = (1− piξo) (1− piµ). Hence,
if fo is concave, T bofo is concave. By Stokey-Lucas-Prescott, the limit of the iterating sequence (T bo )n
is concave and thus Wo is concave. Once this is proved, the dynamic programming equation in
(B.13) implies that Wo is in fact strictly concave, since Ub strictly concave.
C Proofs of Propositions 1 to 3
The characterization results in Section 3.3 follow from the properties of the value functions estab-
lished in Sections A and B. Potential buyers solve problem (A.8), or, equivalently, the problem
described right after Lemma 5. Under the conditions of Theorem 1, an optimal solution to this
problem exists, by the Theorem of the Maximum. Since the price function pˆ in (A.6) is strictly
increasing and strictly convex, the concavity result in Proposition 12 implies that, conditional on
participating in the afternoon market, the optimal solution is unique under the assumptions in
Proposition 1. Hence, by the Theorem of the Maximum, the associated policy function is contin-
uous. This proves Proposition 1. Proposition 2 then follows from the differentiability Wo and the
concavity result in Proposition 12.
Proof. Sice Wo is differentiable (Proposition 9), the optimal solution of buyers who find it optimal
to participate in the afternoon market is characterized by the first-order condition:
[Wo (a− (1 + τ)pˆ(mb))−Wr(a)]−mb (1 + τb) pˆ′(mb)W ′o (a− (1 + τb)pˆ(mb))
= λˆ(a) (1 + τb) pˆ′(mb), (C.1)
where λˆ(a) is the Lagrange multiplier of the borrowing constraint in (A.7). The result is trivial if
λ(a) > 0. If λ(a) = 0, (C.1) can be written as:( 1
1 + τb
)(
Wo (a− (1 + τb) p)−Wr(a)
mbW ′o (a− (1 + τb) p)
)
= pˆ′(mb). (C.2)
This equation has a unique solution (Proposition 1). The term in the left-hand side is the buyer’s
marginal rate of substitution of p formb. Buyers prefer high values ofmb and low values of p. Given
the assumption on gcr(a), Wo is strictly concave, by Proposition 12. If (Wo (a− (1 + τb) p)−Wr(a))
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increases with a for a given p, this implies that the buyer’s marginal rate of substitution is strictly
increasing in a and, hence, so is the optimal value of mb.
The proof of Proposition 3 is based on the original problem where potential buyers choose θ.
The result follows from the continuity and differentiability of Wb and Wr, and Proposition 1.
Proof. Let W˜b(a) denote the value of a potential buyer conditional on participating in the afternoon
market, that is, the value of problem (3.2). Let g˜θb (a) be the associated policy function. Then
Wb(a) = max{W˜b(a),Wr(a)}, (C.3)
and g˜θb (a) = gθb (a) if Wb(a) = W˜b(a) > Wr(a). Since θ0 is only feasible choice for a potential buyer
when a ≤ amin = (1 + τb) pmin − (1− δ) p, Wb(a) = Wr(a) on this range. Suppose a > amin, so the
constraint set of problem (3.2) is nonempty. Applying the Envelope theorem to the Lagrangian of
this problem yields
W˜ ′b(a)−W ′r(a) = mb
(
g˜θb (a)
) (
W ′o
(
a− (1 + τb) p(g˜θb (a))
)
−W ′r(a)
)
+ λ(a). (C.4)
The righthand side of (C.4) is strictly positive because mb(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ R+, the term
in brackets is strictly positive by assumption, and λ(a) ≥ 0. Thus W˜b(a) − Wr(a) is strictly
increasing for a > amin. By assumption, Wb(a) = W˜b(a) > Wr(a) for some a. Since W˜b and Wr
are continuous, there then exists apart such that Wb(a) = W˜b(a) > Wr(a) for all a > apart and
Wb(apart) = W˜b(apart) = Wr(apart). Since p(gθb (a)) > pmin for a > apart, p(θ) is continuous, and
so is gθb (a) on this range (by Proposition 3.2), p(lima→a+part g
θ
b (apart)) > pmin. Thus apart > amin
and, by continuity, this inequality also holds for any a < a0 sufficiently close to apart. Since
W˜b(a) −Wr(a) is strictly increasing on this range, Wb(a) = Wr(a) > W˜b(a) and so gθb (a) = {θ0}
for any a < apart.
Finally, when the borrowing constraint holds for some buyers and is slack for others, the exis-
tence of the threshold a1 follows directly from the following result, which uses the differentiability
of Wo and Wr and the strict monotonicity of Wr.
Lemma 13. If a < a′ and λˆ(a), λˆ(a′) > 0 then λˆ(a′) < λˆ(a).
Proof. If λˆ(a) > 0, the price paid by a buyer with assets a is a+(1−δ)p(1+τb) . Thus (C.1) implies
λˆ(a) = Wo (−(1− δ) p)−Wr(a)(1 + τb)pˆ′(mb) −mbW
′
o (−(1− δ)p)
= Wo (−(1− δ) p)−Wr(a)(1 + τb)pˆ′(mb) −mb uc (g
c
o (−(1− δ) p) , ~) , (C.5)
where the last equality follows from the Envelope theorem. Also, since pˆ(mb) is given by (A.6), mb
satisfies
κs + (1− β)p
mˆs(mb)
+ βp = a+ (1− δ)p(1 + τb) . (C.6)
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If assets increase from a to a′ then mb increases, since mˆs is strictly decreasing, and so does pˆ′(mb),
since pˆ is strictly increasing and strictly convex. SinceWr is strictly increasing by Theorem 1, (C.5)
then implies λˆ(a′) < λˆ(a).
D Computation
In order to compute a stationary equilibrium it is best to rewrite the problems of potential buyers
and intermediaries so that, instead of choosing mb taking pˆ(mb) as given, they choose p taking as
given the inverse of the increasing function pˆ(mb), which we denote by mb(p). For the computation,
it is crucial that mb(θ) is a function instead of a correspondence. In particular, we cannot use the
standard “truncated” Cobb-Douglas matching function. In our calibration, we use the class of
matching functions in Chaumont and Shi (2018) (though the urn-ball matching function could also
be used).
D.1 The matching function and the equilibrium price schedule
Given the Walrasian price p, equation (A.6) determines ms as a function of p:
ms(p) =
κs + (1− β) p
p− β p . (D.1)
This function is strictly decreasing and strictly convex with ms(pmin) = 1 and limp→∞ms(p) = 0,
and does not depend on the choice of the matching technology.
We take ms(θ) = (1 + θ−γ)
−1
γ with γ > 0, and mb(θ) = ms(θ)/θ. Thus mˆs(mb) =
(
1−mγb
)1/γ ,
and we can write
mb(p) = (1−ms(p)γ)1/γ , (D.2)
θ(p) = ms(p)
(1−ms(p)γ)1/γ
. (D.3)
Here, θ(p) is the inverse of p(θ), so it is strictly decreasing and strictly convex with limp→∞ θ(p) = 0
and limp→pmin θ(p) =∞. Also, mb(p) is strictly increasing with mb(pmin) = 0 and limp→∞mb(p) =
1. As shown in Appendix A,mb(p) is strictly concave provided −mˆs′(mb)/mˆs(mb) is non decreasing.
This last assumption can be further relaxed. For instance, for the value of γ used in our calibration
to match the value of median time to buy in the data (and, in fact, for any γ < 1), the assumption
only holds for values of mb above some threshold. Yet we only require that it holds for the range
of values of mb which correspond the submarkets that are active in equilibrium (since eliminating
inactive submarkets does not change the problem of a potential buyer). One can easily verify that it
suffices to check that the slope of −mˆs′(mb)/mˆs(mb) is positive for the lowest value of mb observed
in equilibrium (which corresponds to the optimal choice of a marginal buyer). If so, mb(p) is strictly
concave on the range of prices which correspond to the set of active submarkets, and the results in
Propositions 1 to 3 again hold.
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D.2 The optimal choice of potential buyers
In order to extend the method in Fella (2014) to our framework, we proceed in two steps. The
problem of those potential buyers who participate in the afternoon market in equilibrium can be
written as
Wb(a) maxp {Wr(a) +mb(p) [Wo (a− (1 + τb) p)−Wr(a)] }
s. t. pmin ≤ p ≤ a+(1−δ) p(1+τb) ,
(D.4)
with associated policy function gp(a). By Proposition 3, the constraint p ≥ pmin does not bind.
The buyer’s gains from trading at price p > pmin are S(a, p) = Wo (a− (1 + τ)p)−Wr(a).
By Theorem 1, S(a, p) is strictly decreasing in p. Hence, if S(a, pmin) ≤ 0 then S(a, p) < 0
for all p > pmin, and non-participation is optimal in this case. Suppose that S(a, pmin) > 0,
so the gains from participation are positive. It is direct to check from the first-order condition
of problem (D.4) that the Lagrange multiplier of the borrowing constraint is given by λ(a) =
m′b(p)[S(a, p)−S˜(a, p)], where S˜(a, p) = mb(p)m′
b
(p)uc (g
c
o (a− (1 + τb) p) , ~) (1+τb). Hence, at an optimal
solution, S(a, p) ≥ S˜(a, p), with equality if the constraint does not bind. By the Envelope Theorem,
W ′o = u′ (gco (a− (1 + τb) p)) (a− (1 + τb) p), so gco(a) is non-decreasing if Wo is concave, since u is
strictly concave. Since mb is strictly increasing and strictly concave, this implies that S˜(a, p) is
strictly increasing in p and non-increasing in a. Also, S˜ (a, pmin) = 0 regardless of the value of
a, since mb (pmin) /m′b (pmin) = 0. There is then a unique value p which solves S(a, p) = S˜(a, p)
(in line with Proposition 1), and for this value S(a, p) > 0. There are then two cases: (i) if
p ≤ (a+ (1− δ) p) /(1 + τb) then gp(a) = p, and (ii) otherwise, gp(a) = (a+ (1− δ) p) /(1 + τb).
We use the following algorithm to find gp(a). Given the value functions Wo, Wr and the policy
function gco:
1. Check that S (a, pmin) > 0, so the agent’s gains from participation are positive. (Otherwise,
gθ(a) = θ0).
2. Find the maximum price the agent is willing to pay. This is equal to pr = p˜ where S (a, p˜) = 0
if p˜ ≤ (a+ (1− δ) p) /(1 + τb). Otherwise, pr = (a+ (1− δ) p) /(1 + τb).
3. If S˜ (a, pr) > S (a, pr) use any solver to find a price p ∈ (pmin, pr) for which S˜ (a, p) = S (a, p).
4. If S˜ (a, pr) ≤ S (a, pr), set p = pr.
If S(a, p) is increasing in a, as in our quantitative model, the above arguments imply that both pr
and gp(a) increase with a (in line with Proposition 2). Agents with low assets are constrained and
choose p = (a+ (1− δ) p) /(1 + τb). Wealthier agents are unconstrained.
D.3 The choice of financial assets
Let us focus on the problem solved by the renter at night. The expression for the Euler equation of
the problem depends on whether the agent can participate in the competitive search market in the
next afternoon. Thus there are two cases. If gar (a) + (1− δ) p < (1 + τb)pmin, the Euler equation is:
−uc (gcr(a), hr) +Rβ uc
(
gcr(a′), hr
) ≤ 0, (D.5)
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with equality if a′ = gar (a) > 0. If gar (a) + (1− δ) p ≥ (1 + τb)pmin, the Euler equation becomes
−uc (gcr(a), hr)+Rβ
[
mb
(
gp(a′)
)
uc
(
gco
(
a′ − (1 + τb) gp(a′)
)
, ~
)
+
(
1−mb
(
gp(a′)
))
uc
(
gcr
(
a′
)
, hr
)]
+ Rβ m
′
b (gp(a′))
1 + τb
[
S
(
a′, gp(a′)
)− S˜ (a′, gp(a′))] ≤ 0, (D.6)
with equality if a′ = gar (a) > 0. The problem solved by owners is similar, except for the fact that
they can borrow up to (1−δ) p. We build on Fella (2014) and solve for the optimal consumption rule
using a modified version of his generalized endogenous grid method. The algorithm is as follows:
1. Choose an initial guess for (W jo , W jr , gc,jo , gc,jr ). For the owner’s value function, we use the
value function of an owner that is never hit by any shock as an initial guess. For the renter,
we use that of a renter who never participates in the afternoon market. The consumption
policy function of the renter will have a discontinuity point. We choose aj = (1 + τb) pmin as
the first guess for this point.
2. Solve the afternoon problem as outlined in Section D.2 to find gp(a) and Wb(a).
3. For a given grid for next period’s assets, ga, we use the Euler equation to find consumption
today. We know that, if ga < aj , the Euler equation is (D.5); otherwise it is (D.6). We
need to interpolate to obtain the consumption policy function as a function of the grid of
assets today. We also need to be aware that there is a discontinuity at aj . This is key to
use interpolation to find the policy function of consumption (as a function of assets today).
To find the global maximum in a particular region, we follow Fella (2014). There is a cutoff
point below which the renter knows that she will not participate in the afternoon market in
next period. Save the node as aj+1. Save W j+1o , W j+1r , gc,j+1o , gc,j+1r .
4. Go to step 2. Iterate until convergence.
A grid of 400 points in financial assets gives very high accuracy and is very fast.
D.4 The stationary distribution
We cannot use Monte Carlo simulations in this setup because of the curse of dimensionality. Monte
Carlo simulations are a good approximation of the invariant distribution when we are certain that
the law of large numbers holds across simulations. This is not the case here, however. This is
so because the level a of financial assets is a continuous variable. In this case, any change in the
distribution of financial assets implies a change in the number of submarkets which are active in
equilibrium. Using Monte Carlo simulations would require using a sample so large that the law of
large numbers holds in each possible submarket, which is computationally unfeasible.
We thus solve for the stationary distribution as in Huggett (1993) and as explained in Ríos-Rull
(1997). We use a much finer grid than the one used to solve the household’s problem (800 points
in our case) and guess the distribution of owners and renters at night. Then we use the policy
functions for financial assets to integrate numerically and find the distribution of non-traders and
potential buyers in the afternoon as shown in equations (2.11)–(2.14). We iterate until convergence.
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D.5 The algorithm to find the stationary equilibrium
1. Choose an initial guess for the Walrasian price p and obtain the price function in (D.2).
2. Solve the household’s afternoon problem as stated in Subsection D.3.
3. Find the invariant distribution. Calculate the mass N of non traders in the afternoon.
4. Given the stationary distribution of buyers, use (2.15) to calculate the density of buyers for
each level of financial assets, b(a). For the buyers who participate, use gp(a) to calculate the
probabilities of selling and buying, and thus
θ˜(a) = ms (g
p(a))
mb (gp(a))
. (D.7)
5. Find the amount of vacant homes needed to satisfy the rational expectations condition at the
guessed prices:
S′ =
∫
A
b(a)
θ˜(a)
da. (D.8)
6. Compare S′ with the actual number of vacant homes, H −N . If S′ > H −N (the price p is
too low), update p upwards. If S′ < H −N , update p downwards. Go back to step 1.
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Figure 1: The optimal choice of an unconstrained buyer.
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Figure 2: The optimal choice of a borrowing-constrained buyer.
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(a) The price policy function gp(a) (b)
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(c) The renter’s consumption policy function gcr(a)
(d) The renter’s value function Wr(a)
Figure 4: Policy functions
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(a) (b)
Figure 5: Prices and time to buy as a function of financial assets for different values of δ.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 6: Prices and Time to Buy as a function of financial assets (I)
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 7: Prices and Time to Buy as a function of financial assets (II).
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Table 1: Calibration
Param. Observation Value
w Monthly wage 1000.0000
r (annually) Díaz & Luengo-Prado (IER 2010) 0.0391
rh AHS, median housing costs renters 28% of income 0.25w
τb Indirect taxes on buyers 0.0250
τs Indirect taxes on owners 0.0600
κs Cost of posting a vacancy 0.0000
δ SCF, median LTV ratio = 41.04% 0.5000
piµ NAR: Median tenure of 10 years 0.0059
piξo Annual mobility of owners = 3.2 % 0.0025
piξr Annual mobility of renters = 12 % 0.0100
σ Risk aversion parameter 2.0000
hr/~ Homeownership rate = 69.43% 0.9996
β Median W/E for renters = 0.3450 0.8480
γ Median Time To Buy (NAR) [10 12] 0.6552
H/N (%) Median H/E for owners = 2.7223 70.3789
Notes: The model period is a month. Annualized values. The monthly wage w is the
numeraire and has been set w = 1000.
Table 2: The benchmark steady state
Target Benchmark Data Source
Homeownership rate 69.4280 69.4258 SCF mean1989-2007
Median H/E owners 2.7182 2.7223 SCF median 1989-2007
Median LTV ratio 38.6840 41.0448 "
Median W/E renters 0.2819 0.3450 "
Median Time to Buy 11.5670 [10-12] NAR 2017
Rent-to-Price ratio (%) 9.4319 [8-15] Sommer and Sullivan (2018)
Median TOM 10.2620 [4-17] NAR 2017
Months of Supply 2.6068 5.4737 NAR 2017
Vacancy rate (%) 2.1816 2.1766 AHS, mean 2011-2015
C.V. of prices (%) 0.9269
Mean error (%) 0.8489
% Sales out of 1% price interval 59.2480 49.8% Zillow 5% interval
Gini of renters wealth Gr 0.5345
Gini of wealth (all) G 0.2221
Notes: Median TTB refers to median Time to Buy, whereas media Time on the Market refers to time to
sell. Both statistics are reported in weeks. The rest of the statistics are reported in annual terms.
58
Table 3: Long run changes in the down payment
Target δ = 0.45 δ = 0.5 δ = 0.55
Fixed H Const. Benchmark Fixed H Const.
p/pbench 1.0996 1.0000 0.91491
H/Hbench 0.9111 1.0000 -
Homeownership rate 69.4850 76.2090 69.4280 69.3790 -
Median H/E owners 2.9712 2.7182 2.7049 2.4782 -
Median LTV ratio 43.8840 43.5800 38.6840 33.7430 -
Median W/E renters 0.2910 0.4007 0.2819 0.2731 0.0058
Rent-to-Price ratio (%) 8.5773 9.4340 9.4319 10.3090 9.4340
Median Time to Buy 12.0780 11.5920 11.5670 11.2200 -
Median TOM 9.8880 10.2000 10.2620 10.5950 -
Months of Supply 2.5078 2.6012 2.6068 2.6890 -
Vacancy rate (%) 2.1019 2.3837 2.1816 2.2509 0.0000
CV of prices (%) 0.5065 0.7409 0.9295 1.0244 -
% of sales error > 1% 42.9450 43.5820 59.2480 47.7330 -
Price range 1.0752 1.0244 1.0241 1.0251 -
Gini of renters wealth 0.5275 0.4572 0.5345 0.5381 0.0000
Gini of wealth (all) 0.2220 0.1622 0.2221 0.2222 0.0000
Potential buyers 31.1000 24.4330 31.1560 31.2050 100.0000
Participation rate 6.8527 9.3561 6.6836 6.4148 0.0000
Marg. buyer a/(12w) 1.3983 1.2713 1.4055 1.4083 1.5390
Actual purchases (%) 27.6780 28.2130 28.2850 29.4310 -
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